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Introductory note
1. The introductory note in the fourth report on
jurisdictional immunities of States and their property
may still serve as a useful introduction to the present
report, which is the fifth in the series of reports I
prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the topic and
submitted to the International Law Commission for
consideration. 2 This fifth report is also foreshadowed
by the general considerations of the scope of part III
(art. 11), set out in the fourth report. 3

A. Consideration of draft articles in progress
2. It may be useful at this juncture to give a very brief
account of the general structure of the draft articles, to
indicate the extent of progress achieved so far and what
is envisaged for the remainder of the study. The four
I This series of reports was preceded by an exploratory report
prepared in 1978 by the Working Group on the topic
(A/CN.4/l.279/Rev.I), reproduced in part in Yearbook ... 1978,
vol. II (Part Two), pp. 153-155.
'The previous reports were: (a) preliminary report, Yearbook ... 1979, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document A/CN.41
323; (b) second report, Yearbook ... 1980, vol. II (Part One),
p. 199, document A/CN.4/33 I and Add.l; (c) third report,
Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part One), p. 125, document A/CN.4/340
and Add.l; (d) fourth report, Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part One),
p. 199, document A/CN.4/357.
, Document A/CN.4/357 (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 10-28.

previous reports have covered the first two parts,
namely part I (Introduction) and part II (General principles), as well as the initial articles of Part III (Exceptions to State immunity).
1.

PART

I.

INTRODUCTION

3. Part I (Introduction) comprises five articles. Article 1 (Scope of the present articles) was revised and
provisionally adopted by the Commission at its thirtyfourth session.· Article 2 (Use of terms) has in part been
discussed: a definition has been adopted for the term
"court"; some terms have been withdrawn and others
are yet to be discussed and revised.' Article 3 (Inter• Article I as revised reads as follows:
"Article 1. Scope of the present articles
"The present articles apply to the immunity of one State and its
property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State."
See Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part Two), p. 99.
, For the original text of article 2, ibid., p. 95, footnote 224. The
definition adopted (para. I (a» is as follows:
"\. For the purposes of the present articles:
"(a) 'court' means any organ of a State, however named, entitled to exercise judicial functions;" (Ibid., p. 100.)
The definitions of the terms "territorial State" (para. I (e» and
"foreign State" (para. I (d» have been withdrawn. The term "trading
or commercial activity" (para. I (j) is yet to be considered by the
Drafting Committee, in connection with article 12.

Jurlsdictiona. ImmunitiH of StalH and Iheir properly

pretative provisions) has been partly abandoned, while
paragraph 2 remains to be discussed in con.nection with
the criterion for determining the commercial character
of trading or commercial activity as defined in article 2,
para. 1 (f).6 Article 4 (Jurisdiction.al immunitie~ not
within the scope of the present articles) and article 5
(Non-retroactivity of the present articles)' have been
presented to facilitate consideration of the draft articles
and, as customary, will be discussed by the Commission
after the remaining draft articles have been completed.
Thus, of the five articles constituting part I,' only article 1 has been provisionally adopted, while the other
provisions await further discussion and action by the
Commission.

2.

PART

II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

4. Part II (General principles) contains a series of five
more articles, all of which have been fully discussed by
the Commission. Draft article 6 (State immunity), provisionally adopted by the Commission at its thirtysecond session,9 is currently under review in the
Drafting Committee, which is expected to propose
an improved version for reconsideration by the Commission. 10 Articles 7, 8 and 9 were provisionally adopted
by the Commission at its thirty-fourth session, while article 10, which for lack of time is still with the Drafting
Committee, is not expected to present insuperable difficulties. II
• For the text" of article 3, ibid., p. 96, footnote 225. Paragraph
I (a), which deals in detail with what is meant by the expression
"foreign State" for the purposes of the jurisdictional immunities of
States, is to be examined later; paragraph I (b) is no longer required in
view of the adoption of draft article 7, and the definition of the term
"jurisdiction" has been replaced by that of the term "court" (see
footnote 5 above).
, For the texts of articles 4 and 5, see Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II
(Part Two), p. 96, footnotes 226 and 227, respectively.
• Articles I to 5 were first presented in the second report of the
Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (b) above), which was considered
by the Commission at its thirty-second session (Yearbook ... 1980,
vol. II (Part Two), pp. 138 et seq., paras. 111-122) and by the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session (see
"Topical summary, prepared by the Secretariat, of the discussion in
the Sixth Committee on the report of the Commission during the
thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly" (A/CN.4/L.326),
paras. 311-326~.
, Article 6 as provisionally adopted by the Commission at its thirtysecond session reads as follows:
"Article 6. State immunity
"I. A State is immune from the jurisdiction of another State in
accordance with the provisions of the present articles.
"2. Effect shall be given to State immunity in accordance with
the provisions of the present articles."
See Yearbook '" /982, vol. II (Part Two), p. HIO, footnote 239.
II Several revisions have been proposed, such as:
"A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
State except as provided in the present articles"; or " ... except as
provided in articles ... and ... "; or " ... to the extent and subject
to the limitations provided in the present articles".
" Articles 7 to 10 were considered by the Commission at its thirtythird and thirty-fourth sessions: see Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part
Two), pp. 154 et seq., paras. 208-227; and Yearbook '" 1982, vol. II
(Part Two), pp. 97-98, paras. 185-192. See also the observations made
by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in "Topical summary, prepared by the Secretariat, of the discussion in the Sixth Com",Iittee on the report of the Commission during the thirty-seventh sessIon of the General Assembly" (A/CN.4/L.352), paras. 171-178.
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S. Article 6 attempts to state the general principle of
State immunity as a sovereign right from the point of
view of a State claiming immunity from the jurisdiction
of the courts of another State. On the other hand,
article 7, now entitled "Modalities for giving effect
to State immunity" ,12 endeavours to restate, in
paragraph I, the corresponding obligation on the part
of the other State to accord immunity or give effect to
State immunity by refraining from exercising the jurisdiction of its otherwise competent judicial authority
in a given case involving a foreign State. Paragraph 2
identifies what may be considered to be proceedings
against another State, even when it is not named as a
party, while paragraph 3 gives a general classification of
what constitutes a State for the purposes of jurisdictional immunities, namely an organ of the State, an
agency or instrumentality of the State in respect of "an
act performed in the exercise of governmental authority", or "one of the representatives of that State in
respect of an act performed in his capacity as a representative". A State is also impleaded when the proceeding
is designed to deprive that State of its property or of the
use of property in its possession or control. Article 7 is,
indeed, a central provision of part II of the draft articles. Together with article 6, which is to be revised, it
contains the main general principles of State immunity.l!
6. Article 8 (Express consent to the exercise of
jurisdiction)l. constitutes an important qualification by
stipulating that absence of consent is a prerequisite for a
successful claim of State immunity. It also spells out the
various ways in which consent may be expressly given."
"

"Article 7.

Modalities for giving effect to State immunity

"I. A State shall give effect to State immunity (under article 6)
by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its
courts against another State.
"2. A proceeding before a court of a State shall be considered
to have been instituted against another State, whether or not that
other State is named as a party to that proceeding, so long as the
proceeding in effect seeks to compel that other State either to submit to the jurisdiction of the court or to bear the consequences of a
determination by the court which may affect the rights, interests,
properties or activities of that other State.
"3. In particular, a proceeding before a court of a State shall be
considered to have been instituted against another State when the
proceeding is instituted against one of the organs of that State. or
against one of its agencies or instrumentalities in respect of an act
performed in the exercise of governmental authority, or against one
of the representatives of that State in respect of an act performed in
his capacity as a representative, or when the proceeding is designed
to deprive that other State of its property or of the use of property
in its possession or control." (Yearbook ... 1982. vol. II (Part
Two), p. 100.)

" See the commentary to article 7. ibid.• pp. 100 et seq.
,. "Article 8. Express consent to the exercise of jurisdiction
"A State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in a proceeding before a court of another State with regard to any matter if
it has expressly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by that
court with regard to such a matter:
"(a) by international agreement;
"(b) in a written contract; or
"(c) by a declaration before the court in a specific case." (Ibid.•
p. 107.)
" See the commentary to article 8, ibid., pp. 107 et seq.

Documents of the thirty-fifth session

7. Article 9 (Effect of participation in a proceeding
before a court)" specifies the conditions for giving consent by conduct and defines the extent to which a State
is considered to have consented by participating in a
proceeding before a court, and, by so limiting the scope
of its effect, also serves to indicate the circumstances in
which a State can intervene or take a step in a proceeding without being considered to have consented to
the exercise of jurisdiction by that court. 17
8. Article 10 (Counter-claims), as revised by the
Special Rapporteur, II is still under consideration by the
Drafting Committee. It deals with the extent of the effect of counter-claims against a State which has itself instituted a legal proceeding in a court of another State, as
well as counter-claims by a State."
3.

PART

III.

EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY

9. Articles 11 (Scope of the present part) and 12
(Trading or commercial activity), presented by the
Special Rapporteur in his fourth report,20 were the subject of extensive preliminary discussion during the
thirty-fourth session of the Commission. The drafts of
these articles in their original form, as well as the revised
versions 21 prepared in the light of the discussion in the

"

"Article 9. Effect of participation in a
proceeding before a court

"I. A State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in a proceeding before a court of another State if it has:
"(a) itself instituted that proceeding; or
"(b) intervened in that proceeding or taken any other step
relating to the merits thereof.
"2. Paragraph I (b) above does not apply to any intervention or
step taken for the sole purpose of:
"(a) invoking immunity; or
"(b) asserting a right or interest in property at issue in the pro·
ceeding.
"3. Failure on the part of a State to enter an appearance in a
proceeding before a court of another State shall not be considered
as consent of that State to the exercise of jurisdiction by that
court." (Ibid., p. 109.)
" See the commentary to article 9, ibid., pp. 109 et seq.
II

"Article 10.

Commission,22 are still with the Drafting Committee.
The Commission has resolved to appoint and convene
the next Drafting Committee at the beginning of the
forthcoming session, so as to allow it to complete its
work on the draft articles referred to its predecessor
and to itself.
10. Article 11 (Scope of the present part), in its revised
form,H may still have a useful role to playas a link between part II (General principles) and part III (Exceptions to State immunity) and as warning sign announcing the approach to a "grey zone".
11. Article 12 (Trading or commercial activity), both
in its original version and as slightly revised by the
Special Rapporteur, 24 represents the first entry into a
"controversial area". The Commission has had an interesting round of discussion on this subject and the
draft will be examined by the Drafting Committee
in 1983.

B. Debate in the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly
12. As the thirty-seventh session of the General
Assembly, the debate of the Sixth Committee on the
substance of the topic of jurisdictional immunities of
States and their property was particularly rich. More
than 40 representatives spoke on one aspect or another
of State immunity and commented on the draft articles
provisionally adopted by the Commission on those still
under consideration by the Drafting Committee and on
the methods of approach.2! The Special Rapporteur has
been encouraged by the constructive observations from
representatives of Member States and ventures to think
that it would be useful to clarify some of the points
raised so as to make them crystal clear, beyond any
reasonable shadow of doubt, especially regarding the
methods, objectives and structure of the work undertaken on the topic and to be progressively continued.

Counter-claims

"I. In any legal proceedings instituted by a State, or in which a
State has taken part or a step relating to the merit, in a court of
another State, jurisdiction may be exercised in respect of any
counter-claim arising out of the same legal relationship or facts as
the principal claim, or if, in accordance with the provisions of the
present articles, jurisdiction could be exercised, had separate proceedings been instituted before that court.
"2. A State making a counter-claim in proceedings before a
court of another State is deemed to have given consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by that court with respect not only to the
counter-claim but also to the principal claim, arising out of the
same legal relationship or facts [as the counter-claim)." (Ibid.,
p. 95, footnote 218.)
It Certain doubts were expressed in the general discussion in the
Commission at its thirty-fourth session as to the usefulness of
paragraph 2. On balance, it appears to have an independent purpose.
It is useful to know precisely the extent to which a State making a
counter-claim may be said to have consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court in respect of the principal claim and none
other.
.. For the texts of articles II and 12 as originally presented by the
Special Rapporteur, ibid., p. 95, footnotes 220 and 221, respectively.
.. The revised texts of articles II and 12 were presented to the Draf·
ting Committee as document A/CN.4/L.351 (see footnotes 23 and 24
below).

1.

THE INDUCTIVE METHOD

13. Despite certain criticism from outside the Commission and the Sixth Committee of the seeming indifference and relatively inactive role of developing nations
" Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part Two). pp. 98-99, paras. 193-197.
"Article 1J. Scope of the present part
"
"The application of the exceptions provided in part III of the
present articles may be subject to a condition of reciprocity or any
other condition as mutually agreed between the States concerned."
(Ibid., p. 99, footnote 237.)
"Article 12. Trading or commercial activity
"
"I. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of another State in respect of proceedings
relating to any trading or commercial activity conducted, partly or
wholly, in the territory of that otlier State, by the State itself or by
one of its organs or agencies whether or not organized as a separate
legal entity.
"2. Paragraph I does not apply to transactions or contracts
concluded between States or on a government-to-government
basis." (Ibid.)
" See "Topical summary ..... (A/CN.4/L.352), paras. 157-185.

Jurisdictional immunities of States and their propert)"

in the process of international law-making,26 it is
reassuring to hear comments in the Sixth Committee
highlighting the practical importance of the topic and its
extreme complexities, notwithstanding its assignment
for the first time to an Asian Special Rapporteur from a
developing country of very great antiquity. It is also
most reassuring to this Special Rapporteur to hear confirmation of his finding, through the inductive method
as proposed by Mr. Tsuruoka 27 -another Asian jurist of
profound traditional legal background-that State immunity is based on fundamental principles of international law, among which have been mentioned, unchallenged, the sovereignty and sovereign equality of
States. The inductive method has not been the primary
approach used in the study of all topics but is highly
recommended for the present topic and has become the
selected and respected method. 21
14. According to this inductive method, as the Special
Rapporteur has pointed out time and again, no deus ex
machina is used. Rather, reference is made in the study
to the existing practice of all States, large and small, rich
and poor, developing or industrially more advanced,
before reaching any conclusion. The search is concentrated first and foremost on judicial practice, or judicial
decisions, but not necessarily confined to them. It
covers also national legislations as evidence of State
practice and opinions of writers on the practice as wen
as the principles. It does not omit or overlook the views
of Governments on all relevant questions. The treaty
practice of an States has also been examined, as well as
bilateral treaties and multilateral or regional conventions.
15. Indeed, the search for basic materials has been
very thorough and, from the start of its study of the
topic, the Commission decided, on the recommendation
of the Special Rapporteur, to ask an Member States to
lend their support by communicating information,
materials concerning judicial decisions, case-law, national legislation and opinions of Governments, as wen
as replies to the questionnaire prepared by the
Secretariat in co-operation with the Special
Rapporteur. 29 Neither he nor those States which have
not provided information concerning judicial and
government practice can be justly accused of omission
or neglect, since practice is to evolve and cannot be
fabricated. Nevertheless, neither the Special Rapporteur, nor the Commission, nor the Sixth Committee
can belittle the significance of existing practice as is
prevalent the world over and which remains unopposed
" See UNIT AR, The International Law Commission. The Need
a New Direction (United Nations publication, Sales
No. E.8J.XV.PE/I), especially pp. 13-15.
" See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Sixth Commillee, 48th meeting, para. 40.
" See, on this question, the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur
(see footnote 2 (d) above), para. 10.
" The materials submitted by Governments, as well as their replies
to the questionnaire, appear in the volume of the United Nations
Legislative Series entitled Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and their Property (Sales No. E/F.8J.V.IO).

for
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~y other silent States in the absence of opposing practIce.

2.

CONTRADICTIONS AND DIVERGENCES
IN STATE PRACTICE

16. On the other hand, it should also be observed that
in the study of the present topic, resort to the inductiv~
method has proved most disconcerting. To begin with,
not all States have developed or even started to develop
a judicial practice on this or indeed on any topic of
public or private international law . Within the Commission, the question has been raised whether it could be
said that the principle of State immunity was ever truly
established in State practice, when the Commission has
had before it the judicial practice of only a handful of
States. The Special Rapporteur was at pains to explain
that all the available evidence of existing State practice
on State immunity had been presented to the Commission. It was not at random or by a selective method that
the practice of only 25 countries had been used in the
preparation of earlier reports and that not all examples
had been individually presented for examination and
comments in the study of each and every aspect of State
immunity, to which some were in any event not really
pertinent.
17. It is not unnatural that contradictions and
divergences abound in the judicial practice of the
various nations examined, and indeed in the practice of
the same legal system or even of the same court of law
over the same period of time. If the Special Rapporteur
had been shy to expose such inconsistencies, he would
have been guilty of further distorting the already much
distorted practice of States. It is distorted in that its
development has followed a somewhat zigzagging and
tortuous path, almost like the mighty Asian river, the
Mekong, which has its source in the highest mountains
in the world, the Himalayas, and whose water is derived
from unrecorded rainfall and melting snow, flowing
from endless tributaries through the rapids of Tibet and
converging into the Mekong's main stream between
Burma, Laos and Thailand, rushing through Kampuchea with added momentum from the Great Lake,
forming countless islands and precipices, disfiguring
landscapes and finally diverging into a gushing delta
before plunging into the absorbing Gulf of Thailand.
3.

EMERGENCE OF CONVERGING PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE

18. A bird's-eye view of the tortuous path taken by
legal developments, comparable to that of the Mekong
River, is bound to give a picture that appears twisted
and distorted, with the exception of some relatively
straighter stretches. Just as it does not appear humanly
possible to straighten the course of the Mekong, so it
seems impossible to unbend every twist and turn in the
path of development of the law. As the Thames flows
through many bends and brooks before reaching its
estuary and the North Sea, so British practice concerning trading or commercial activity of State-owned or
State-operated vessels cannot be said to have finally

30
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been settled until the long overdue decision of the House
of Lords in the "I Congreso del Partido" case (1981),30
and not without legislative initiatives and judicial hesitations. A study of the judicial practice of States does not
lend itself to a facile restatement of ready-made law of
any country. On the contrary, it shows an intensified
process of judicial reasoning which is dialectic and empirical rather than dogmatic or dictatorial.
19. The Sixth Committee concurred with the finding
of the Commission that the general principle of State
immunity was established in the practice of States. It
should be added that, when State immunity was considered to have been firmly established, the world was
not so divided into socialist and non-socialist, or
developing and industrially advanced countries. Indeed,
when the principles of an international law of State immunity were widely accepted, there were no socialist
States, nor so-called advanced countries. The first pronouncement of the law was by the highest authority of
the world's youngest nation at the time, the United
States of America, in The Schooner "Exchange"
v. McFaddon and others (l812),l! and -it was from the
startbased on existing customary intemationallaw~- not
on United States law, nor on American law. Indeed, the~
United States was only an infant nation compared with
aged Thailand and old Japan; it was like a child just
starting to talk and walk, having just won its national
independence. The process of decolonization took more
than a few decades. It was during the height of the
Napoleonic Wars (1812), with Europe torn by serious
conflicts in the north, the east and the south, that State
immunity was recognized. The law on the subject came
to be settled in that young, revolutionary and thriving
nation even before it had to undergo a national convulsion, the unsettling experience of the Civil War.

20. International law on State immunity was established in Belgium 32 and Italy33-equally young and
newly independent States of Europe-in a very restrictive sense. Egyptian practice H followed suit. Although
.. The All England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1064; see the judgment pronounced by Lord Wilberforce (pp. 1066-1078), as well as the
concurring opinion of Lord Edmund-Davies in favour of dismissing
the appeal in the "Marble Islands" case (pp. 1080-1082), and the
dissenting opinions of Lord Diplock (pp. 1078-1080) and of Lord
Keith and Lord Bridge (pp. 1082-1083), in favour of allowing an appeal in both cases.
" W. Cranch, Reports 0/ Cases argued and adjudged in the
Supreme Court 0/ the United States (New York, 1911), vol. VII (3rd
ed.), p. 116.
" See, for example, Etat du Perou v. Kreglinger (1857) (Pasicrisie
beige, 1857 (Brussels), part 2, p. 348); see also the decision of the
Court of Appeal of Brussels of 30 December 1840 (ibid., 1841, part 2,
p. 33), and the cases cited in the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 58-59 .
.. See, for example, Morellel v. Governo Danese (1882)
(Giurisprudenza Italiana (Turin), vol. XXXV, part I (1883), pp. 125
and 130-131), and the cases cited in the fourth report of the Special
Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 56-57.
.. See, tor example, the S.S. "Sumatra" case (1920) (Bulletin de
legislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes (Alexandria), vol. 33
(1920-1921), p. 25; Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris),
vol. 48 (1921), p. 270), and the cases cited in the fourth report of the
Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 60-61.

its mixed courts were somewhat international, Egypt,
itself an old nation, belongs to Africa and the Mediterranean rather than to central Europe. Practice did
not start developing all at once in every country at the
same time.
21. The Commission and subsequently the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly were able to recognize
the existence of a general principle of State immunity on
the basis of an examination of the judicial practice of a
few States in the nineteenth century, although of course
the extent of State immunity was by no means uniform.
The practice of major European Powers such as the
United Kingdom,3S France 36 and Germany3? was full of
uncertainties and surprises. Nevertheless, out of this utter confusion it was possible to identify the emergence
of a clear general rule of State immunity.

4.

ABSENCE OF PRACTICE IN SOME STATES

22. Doubts have been raised as to the correctness of
identifying as international law the customary law as
developed through the practice of only 25 countries and
applying it to the rest of the community of nations, as if
the Commission had deIiberalely omItted to examine the
practice of any State. The truth is the opposite. Each
and every State has been consulted. The examination of
State practice has been thorough and exhaustive. None
was left out. There are no other decisions or outside experts to be consulted, no extraterrestrial beings to inform us of what the law is in such and such a country at
such and such a time. The fact remains that, of the existing and available practice of States, the Commission
has taken occasion to consider all, without fear or
favour.
23. The conclusion that is emerging is clear enough.
State immunity was never considered to be an absolute
principle in any sense of the term. At no time was it
viewed as a jus cogens or an imperative norm. The rule
was from the beginning subject to various qualifications, limitations and exceptions. This is recognized
even in the recent legislation adopted in certain socialist
countries.3I The differences of opinion seem to linger
only in the areas where exceptions and limitations are
put into application. That is why part III of the draft articles, "Exceptions to State immunity", has already
given rise to some controversies. But the argument
should apply ajortiori, or at least with equal force, that
the evolutionary process of the law does not require the
positive or active participation of all States. While it
cannot exclude any State from participation, absence of
practice is no ground for liability for neglect or
negligence on the part of States. However, such absence
cannot be invoked to invalidate or otherwise downgrade
.. See, for example, the cases cited in the fourth report of the
Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 80-87.
" Idem, paras. 62-66.
" Idem, paras. 67-68 .
.. See, for example, article 61 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Union
Republics, reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities ... , p. 40.
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the existing and prevailing practice of which abundant
evidence is available elsewhere. If once it was admissible
that there was a law of State immunity, it should be
equally admissible to define and identify its contents
and examine its application in controversial areas. That
is precisely the purpose of part 1II.

C. Advancement of work on preparation
of the draft articles
24. Encouraged by the substantial support voiced in
the Sixth Committee for the existing structure of the
draft articles, and bearing in mind the words of caution
and wise advice pronounced by so many well-wishers, as
well as the constructive proposals for drafting improvements which will be taken into consideration at or
before the second reading of the draft articles, the
Special Rapporteur is ready to proceed along the path
that has been charted with the approval of the Commission and the endorsement of the Sixth Committee.
Without prejudice to his future findings, the Special
Rapporteur heartily and gratefully accepts the reminder
that, in his approach to the "grey zone", the paramount
interests of humanity must be recognized, and that consideration should equally be given to safeguarding the
vital interests of all States, including the socialist States,
the developing States and the least developed countries,
whatever their denomination, size, location or ideology,
and of all nations of whatever social, political or
economic structure.
25. At this juncture, the Special Rapporteur begs to
lodge a caveat in the same co-operative and constructive
spirit: it is easy to say, in the absence of State practice in
a given country or without reference thereto, that the
law as developed in the practice of so wide a region as
Asia, Africa or Latin America points in a definite direction, or is the opposite of the prevailing practice in
Western Europe, or is in any way similar to the practice
of socialist countries. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Nothing could be nearly so dangerous as such a
sweeping statement, which the Special Rapporteur, in
all earnestness and good conscience, feels compelled to
implore representatives of States to avoid. A glance at
the judicial practice and national legislations of
Pakistan, India, Singapore or Japan will reveal a strong
trend away from any absolute doctrine. Neither
Pakistan nor Singapore can be said not to be Asian, nor
to be no longer thriving and developing nations. A brief
examination of their legislation and practice will suffice
to silence any sweeping statements about Asian practice
being identified with that of socialist or capitalist countri.es. There is no such thing as practice which could be
said to be the common law of Asia, Africa or Latin
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America, nor are the interests of developing nations
identical or necessarily alike on every issue. Indeed,
each area of controversy should be examined on its own
merits. No predetermined dogma nor any amount of
absolutism should be allowed to dictate or disturb
any serious study of relevant progressive legal
developments. The Special Rapporteur continues to
benefit from the lessons to be learned from the inductive
method and craves the indulgence of representatives of
Governments to continue to be patient so that the process of sedimentation and crystallization of the law may
proceed unimpeded.
26. As planned, therefore, the draft articles dealing
with specified areas in which limitations or exceptions to
State immunity may be recognized and applied will be as
follows:
Article 13 "Contracts of employment";
Article 14 "Personal injuries and damage to property";
Article 15 "Ownership, possession and use of property" ;
Article 16 "Patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties";
Article 17 "Fiscal liabilities and customs duties";
Article 18 "Shareholdings and membership of
bodies corporate";
Article 19 "Ships employed in commercial service";
Article 20 "Arbitration" .
27. It is no accident that the specified areas of controversy under examination in part III have been the
subject of some regulation in a multilateral convention 19
and have partially received legislative ratification in
some countries, both signatories and indeed nonsignatories to this Convention. Such an investigation
does not imply endorsement or disapproval of the proposals contained in the Convention or in any other
bilateral agreements in particular, or as revised and
modified by a number of national legislations.· o
" See Council of Europe, European Convention on State Immunity
and Additional Protocol (1972), European Treaty Series (Strasbourg),
No. 74 (1972); reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictionallmmunities '" ,pp. 156 et seq. See also the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity
of State-owned Vessels (Brussels, 1926) and Additional Protocol
(Brussels, 1934) (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CLXXVI,
pp. 199 and 215; reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictionallmmunities '" , pp. 173 et seq.).
'G See, for example, the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (see footnote 66 below), the United Kingdom
State Immunity Act 1978 (see footnote 65 below), the Pakistan State
Immunity Ordinance. 1981 (see footnote 69 below) and Singapore's
State Immunity Act. 1979 (see footnote 68 below),
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Draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property (continued)
PART Ill.

EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY (continued)

ARTICLE 13 (Contracts or employment)

A_ General considerations
1.

SCOPE OF "CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT"
AS AN EXCEPTION TO STATE IMMUNITY

28. The purpose of draft article 13 is to define the
scope of the area specified as "contracts of employment" as a possible exception to the general principle of
State immunity. Many questions are immediately relevant to the general considerations in this specific area
which concerns primarily "contracts of employment"
between individuals and a State for the performance of
services within the territory of another State.
29. "Contracts of employment" between individuals
and a corporation or an agency not attributable to a
State, nor to an organ of a State, nor to one of its agencies or instrumentalities acting in the exercise of the
governmental authority of the State as stipulated in article 7, paragraph 3," of the present draft articles, will
lie outside the scope of the current study. Only "contracts of employment" concluded by or on behalf of a
State as employer would come under the purview of article 13. The first element is therefore employment by a
State, as the area of investigation is confined to the contractual relationship between individuals and a State for
the performance of services in the territory of another
State.
30. The second element appears to be the services to be
rendered by the employees of that State within the territory or the territorial jurisdiction of another State.
The cause of action or the dispute in question would
relate to the contractual relationship with the State as an
employer before the courts of another State.
31. The third element is the possibility or justiciability
of proceedings brought before the courts of another
State against the employer State by an employee seeking
redress in respect of a breach of a term of the contract
of employment, based on an existing contractual relationship binding on the State in respect of services
rendered or performed in the territory of another State.
The subject-matter of the dispute may be classified as
labour relations or the terms and conditions of employment, covering compensation, social security, pensions,
and so on. In other words, the gist of this specified area
of exceptions to State immunity covers the actionability
of obligations undertaken by, or binding on, a State and
arising out of contracts of employment of individuals
for the performance of services in another State. Excluded from the scope of this article are questions of
vicarious responsibility or employer's liability in respect
., See footnote 12 above.

of acts performed by its employees, even in the territory
of another State. Such liability may be relevant in a different context, but the present question is concerned exclusively with proceedings based on the relationship between individual employees and an employer which is a
foreign State or foreign Government from the point of
view of the State of the forum.
2.

THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION

32. In an examination of the extent of State immunity
in any specified area of activity, the question of jurisdiction is not altogether irrelevant, since, in any event, it is
the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign State that is at
stake. State immunity, in the area of "contracts of
employment" under examination, necessarily presupposes the existence of jurisdiction, the non-exercise of
which is required by application of State immunity. For
this reason, the scope of "contracts of employment" in
the present study is confined to the employment by a
State of individuals for a service to be rendered or performed in the territory of another State, that is in the
territory of the forum-in other words, within the
jurisdiction of the courts of that other State.
33. Jurisdiction is therefore presupposed in any question of State immunity. The closest connection should
exist with the court trying the dispute arising out of the
contract of employment. This is translatable in terms of
the territory where the service is performed under the
contract of employment, namely within the territory of
another State, and therefore within the jurisdiction of
the courts of that other State. Without this intimate link
to the territory of that other State, the question of State
immunity could be confused with other questions or
other grounds for non-justiciability of the dispute, for
lack of jurisdiction, either because of the absence of a
territorial connection or because of the nature of the
subject-matter of the dispute, or for any other reason,
such as the "act of State" doctrine. Since jurisdiction of
a court is a matter of local or national law , it is not for
this study to lay down a set of uniform rules regarding
the qualifications for jurisdiction of a court of law or a
labour court in a given country. Jurisdiction may, in
any event. be initially presumed to exist once there is
prima facie proof of sufficient territorial connection
with the trial court through performance of the employment within the territory of the State of the forum. The
rules to be proposed in respect of the extent of State immunity in this specified area should preclude circumstances in which the courts of a State would have
jurisdiction in a case concerning a contract of employment performed outside its territory or, regardless of
the place of performance, on account of a special arrangement or regime, such as that governing civil servants or government employees in active service at an
embassy or consulate or a comparable office accredited
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in another country. In such circumstances, the administrative tribunal or the civil service commission or
any other analogous institution of the State employing
the individual could still have an operable jurisdiction,
and the applicable law is still the administrative law or
the law governing the civil servants of the employing
State as distinct from the labour law of the country in
which the service is to be performed.

3.

THE QUESTION OF APPLICABLE LAW

34. In private international law as well as in the
borderland where it overlaps with public international
law, the choice of applicable law is often indicative if
not determinative of the preferred jurisdiction among
the competing or concurrent competent authorities. The
question of applicable law may accordingly be highly
pertinent, especially when it is a specialized branch of
the law peculiar to a special regime or system, such as
the regulations regarding the staff of the Secretariat of
the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The
Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations is
probably considered the chosen forum for disputes regarding administrative matters (pensions, promotion,
leave, etc.) affecting members of the staff of the United
Nations Secretariat. It is probably a preferred jurisdiction compared with other competent local or territorial
courts of law or a labour tribunal. The same could be
said of the regulations applying to State employees, at
least the higher-ranking officials, or the international
staff in the case of international organizations.
35. The choice of law may be expressed by the parties,
which tends to suggest almost exclusively the choice of
jurisdiction. With regard to civil servants and highranking State employees, it is presumed that it is the administrative law of the employer State that governs
labour relations and that the court of law or administrative tribunal of the employer State or sending
State is the chosen forum, if not indeed the forum pro
rogatum, alone competent to decide the issue. Territorial courts or local labour courts, however substantively competent to deal with such disputes, would likely
be less conversant with the applicable labour laws of the
sending State or the employer State. The question of applicable law in a given case must therefore be properly
considered in this particular connection.
36. Concurrence of jurisdiction exercisable by the territorial court or the State of the forum and by the national court or the court of the sending State is further
complicated by the concurrence of their respective applicable laws. In a clear case of applicable administrative law of the sending State, because of the
high offices of the civil servants or government
employees in question, for example, the local labour
court or even the territorial administrative tribunal or
authorities may feel inclined to yield to the application
of foreign administrative law and therefore may decline
jurisdiction in favour of a more proper or more convenient forum, on the grounds perhaps of forum non
conveniens, because of the special relationship or the
special nature of the foreign administrative law. If, on
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the other hand, the case concerns local staff of lower
rank and does not call for the application of foreign administrative law, but more appropriately the applicable
local labour law or the law governing contracts of
employment in the State of the forum, then the territorial court would not hesitate to exercise its competent jurisdiction, being more certain of the application of its own substantive law relating to the operation
of contracts of employment, working conditions, terms
of compensation, and so on. The question may appropriately be asked whether and how far the territorial
State wishes to impose its own labour laws and regulations on all employment of services within its territory.

4.

THE QUESTION OF STATE IMMUNITY

37. Only when the court in the State in which services
under the contract of employment are to be performed
considers that it has jurisdiction and that it is competent
will it proceed to apply its own substantive law regarding labour disputes and labour relations. Where the
employer happens to be a foreign State or Government,
the question of immunity comes into play. But, of
course, in actual practice the foreign State being proceeded against does not normally wait until the court
reaches that finding, but would be expected to raise a
plea of State immunity in any event. Thus the court is
called upon to decide the issue of State immunity quite
often when there is not yet any necessity to do so, since,
without the question of State immunity, the court could
have easily declined jurisdiction on any of the grounds
mentioned, such as lac~ of competence, forum non conveniens or choice of jurisdiction and choice of applicable law, for reasons of public policy, or because of
the "act of State" doctrine.
38. However, when the court is faced with the question of State immunity in this specified area of "contracts of employment", the first essential point which
may determine the exercise or non-exercise of its
jurisdiction relates to the existence of the governmental
authority of the State, <2 in the exercise of which a cause
of action has arisen. If, for instance, the dispute concerns the appointment or non-appointment of an officer
by a foreign State or by one of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities, then there is a clear case for State immunity because such appointment or non-appointment
would have to result from an act in the exercise of the
governmental authority of that foreign State or Government. The same is true of the dismissal or suspension of
an employee by a State or governmental agency, which
could never be compelled to re-employ or reinstate an
employee thus dismissed as a result of an act done in the
exercise of governmental authority. It does not follow,
however, that the legal consequences of dismissal in
breach of a contract of employment are necessarily a
result of an act done in the exercise of governmental
authority. There appears to be an area, therefore, where
the local courts can still exercise jurisdiction in proceedings against a foreign State as employer of a worker
for services rendered in the territory of the State of the
., See article 7, para. 3, in footnote 12 above.
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forum and unconnected with the exercise of governmental authority by the employer State. To put it differently, the question could be phrased: how far is the
sending State required to conform to local labour laws
and regulations of the territorial State?
B. The current practice of States

1.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

39. In contrast to the superabundance of judicial and
governmental practice of States in the area of trading or
commercial activity covered by article 12, H there have
been relatively fewer judicial decisions and little
evidence of State practice in regard to contracts of
employment. Yet the adoption of the inductive method
implies a search for guidance from State practice. None
the less, a glance at State practice reveals an equally
startling number of inconsistencies and contradictions,
while the paucity of decisions precludes any reference to
practice on a State-by-State basis. If the treatment of
the exception of trading or commercial activity has been
criticized for not covering the practice of all 165 countries, or for distorting it in some cases, the current practice of States with regard to contracts of employment
can offer no greater comfort nor absolute proof approaching a universal or uniform State practice. It only
indicates a deeper intrusion into a darker or greyer zone
of greater controversy, and, if article 13 is to be at all
meaningful, greater care and prudence must be applied:
wild or sweeping statements would not be helpful.
40. State practice in the specified area of contracts of
employment appears to be comparatively recent, unlike
the rich State practice concerning trading or commercial
activities. This contrast is attributable to the fact that
States have engaged in trading or commercial activities
across or beyond their borders for a long time, resulting
in litigations and judicial decisions in several jurisdictions. On the other hand, the employment abroad of
local personnel by an organ of State or one of its agencies or instrumentalities in the exercise of its governmental authority has been a matter of relatively recent practice. Disputes concerning relations between servants and
masters, or employees and foreign State employers,
have not been too frequent. It is even more uncommon
to find a recorded settlement by local judicial decision
or other administrative adjudication.
41. The stages of development of a separate branch of
civil law or of the law of contract governing labour relations and labour disputes are far from being uniform.
Indeed, many countries do not have a labour code or
-special labour courts or tribunals for the settlement of
labour disputes. Some systems have administrative
tribunals to determine questions or to hear grievances
from employees of their own Government but are not
specifically equipped to apply foreign administrative
laws or to extend their own administrative laws for the
" See the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2
(d) above), paras. 49-)07.

benefit of employees of foreign Governments. The current enquiry is, however, limited to existing practice and
does not investigate the causes of its scarcity.
2.

JUDICIAL PRACTICE

42. Owing to the uneven stages of development of different internal laws governing the specified area of
"contracts of employment", jurisprudence or case-law
cannot be presented on a country-by-country basis;
rather, the content may be treated topic by topic or by
subtopic. However, a meaningful analysis of practice as
evidence of the progress of legal developments will still
have to be based on the inductive method, difficult as it
may seem.
(0)

Appointment or employment by a State

43. There appears to have developed a relatively more
consistent trend in the case-law of States that the question of appointment or employment of personnel of an
office by a State or one of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities is immune from the jurisdiction of the
territorial judicial authorities, provided of course that
the activities of such agencies or instrumentalities are
performed in the exercise of governmental authority."
44. Italian jurisprudence is rich in examples of clear
judicial pronouncements to the effect that the act of appointment or non-appointment of an employee, or the
decision to employ or not to employ a person, by a
foreign State agency is an act of public law essentially
exempt from local jurisdiction. The act of appointment
is often said to be performed in the exercise of governmental functions.·$ Thus, in a decision rendered by the
United Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation in
1947,.6 the Soviet Trade Delegation was held to be exempt from jurisdiction in matters of employment of an
Italian citizen, being acta jure imperii, notwithstanding
the fact that the appointing authority was a separate
legal entity, or for that matter a foreign corporation
established by a State. Similarly, in a more recent case
decided in 1955,47 the Court of Cassation declined
jurisdiction in an action brought by an Italian citizen in
respect of his employment by a United States military
.. See article 7, para. 3, and the commentary thereto (see footnotes
12 and 13 above); see also paras. 5-6 of the I?resent report.
., The distinction between the "functions of the State in the exercise
of its sovereign power, and its activity as a subject of rights of property" was restated afresh in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of
Genoa in Canale v. Governo Francese (1937) (Rivista di diritto internazionale (Rome), 29th year (1937), p. 81, with a critical note by
C. Cereti; ibid., 30th year (1938), p. 226; Annual Digest and Reports
of Public International Law Cases, 1935-1937 (London), vol. 8
(1941), p. 237).
•• Tani v. Rappresentanza commerciale in Italia del/'U.R.S.S.
(1947) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. LXXI (1948), p. 855; Annual
Digest '" , 1948 (London), vol. 15 (1953), case No. 45, p. 141).

., Department of the Army of the United States of America v. Gori
Savellini (1955) (Rivista di diritto internazionale (Milan), vol. XXXIX
(1956), pp. 91-92; International Law Reports, 1956 (London), vol. 23
(1960), p.201). See also Alexeef v. Rappresentanza commerciale
dell'U.R.S.S. (1932) (Giurisprudenza Italian a (Turin), vol. I (1933),
p. 489), where no distinction was made between diplomatic and commercial activities of the Trade Agency.
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base established in Italy in accordance with the North
Atlantic Treaty, this being an altivitiz pubblicistica connected with the funzioni pubbliche 0 politiche of the
United States Government." The act of appointment
was necessarily performed in the exercise of governmental authority, and as such considered to be an atto di
sovranitiz.
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brought by an employee of the Soviet Trade Delegation
for wrongful dismissal. A decision of the French Conseil d'Etat in 1929 in another context also took the same
line. 53
(c) Employment or labour relations

48. In spite of earlier hesitancy in the case-law, 54 recent State practice appears to consider questions of
labour relations or contracts of employment in
substance as matter~ in regard to which foreign State
agencies "are entitled to immunity, as long as it is
established that the agencies in question performed activities in the exercise of governmental authority. 51 Contracts of employment were conceived by Italian judicial
authorities as exceptions to the normal transactions between a foreign State and local citizens amenable to the
(b) Cases of dismissal
jurisdiction of Italian courts. 56 Viewed as atti di
46. Dismissal cases are more abundant in State pracsovranitiz, contracts of employment of employees of
tice and point to the conclusion that the courts do not
foreign Governments were exempted from the jurisdichave competence. The act of dismissal has been retion of the Italian courts which applied the most restricgarded as an ex~rcise_ of sovereign power or govern. . 1 fS'
. Th
. I
5
mental authority rather than a breach or an ordinary--- tiv~pnnclp e 0 tate Immumty.
us, m 956, 7 an action brQught by Gori Savellini against a United States commercial or private contraa-. Italian case-law may be
military base established in Italy was dismissed. In two
cited in support of this proposition. It is all the more
more recent cases, judicial pronouncements were even
conclusive that Italian jurisprudence appears, from its
more explicit. Thus, in De Rilis v. Governo degli Stati
very early days, to be the most restrictive of all State
Uniti d'America (1971)," immunity was upheld in an
practice.
action brought by De Ritis, a librarian with the United
47. Thus immunity was upheld in an action for
States Information Service (USIS) in Italy, having
wrongful dismissal brought by an ex-employee of the
regard to the substantive and objective contents of the
employment or service to be performed, however modMilan branch of the Soviet Trade Delegation in the Kazmann case, decided by the Italian Supreme Court in
est. The Supreme Court considered USIS to be an over1933. 50 This decision became a leading precedent
seas office of the United States Information Agency,
followed by other Italian courts." A later decision by
un ente od ufficio statale americano ... che agisce
the United Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation
all'estero solto 10 direzione ed if controllo del Segretario
in the Tani case in 1947 52 must be regarded as final and
di Stato ... per la persecuzione di fini pubblici sovrani
decisive on this point. It also confirmed the decision of
della Stato americana come tale. 59 The Court held De
the Appellate Court of Milan rejecting the action
Ritis to be an "employee of the United States Government" and secondo concelti propri del nostro diritto
.J Cf. De Ritis v. Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America (1971)
pubblico ma indubbiamente applicabili anche alia fat(Rivista ... ,vol. LV (1972), p. 483) and Luna v. Repubblica socialista
tispecie ... perche I'impiegato di uno Stato e per de/inidi Romania (1974) (ibid., vol. LVIII (1975), p. 597). Contrast,
zione
impiegato pubblico. 60 Although the contract of
however, the decisions in De Semenoffv. Amministrazione delle Feremployment was undoubtedly un rapporto di lavoro, it
rovie dello Stato della Norvegia (1935, 1936) (ibid., 29th year (1937),
45. In a different context, the French Conseil d'Etat
regarded appointment of a French national to a position
in UNESCO, as well as failure of the French Government to support the claims of an ex-official of the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation and his entitlement
to a UNESCO position, as being outside the competence
of the French authorities.· 9

p. 224; Annual Digest ... , 1935-1937, op. cit., case No. 92, p. 234),
concerning a case of employment by the State railways of a foreign
Government operating in Italy, and in Slomnitzky v. Rappresentanza
commerciale dell'U.R.S.S. (1932) (Annual Digest ... , 1931-1932
(London) vol. 6 (1938), case No. 86, p. 169).
•• Weiss v. Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (1953) (Journal du
droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 81 (1954), p. 745, with a note
by P. Huet).
.. Rappresentanza commerciale deIl'U.R.S.S. v. Kazmann (1933)
(Rivista ... ,25th year (1933), p. 240; Annual Digest ... , 1933-1934
(London), vol. 7 (1940), case No. 69, p. 178).
II See, for example, Little v. Riccio e Fischer (Court of Appeal of
Naples, 1933) (Rivista ... ,26th year (1934), p. 110), (Court of Cassation, 1934) (Annual Digest ... , 1933-1934, op. cit., case No. 68,
p. 177); the Court of Appeal of Naples and the Court of Cassation
disclaimed jurisdiction in this action for wrongful dismissal by Riccio,
an employee in a cemetery the property of the British Crown and
"maintained by Great Britain jure imperii for the benefit of her nationals as such, and not for them as individuals". Cf. Mazzucchi
v. Consolato Americano (1931) (Annual Digest '" , 1931-1932, op.
cit., case No. 186, p. 336).
" See footnote 46 above; an illuminating judgment may be found in
Annual Digest ... , 1948, pp. 145-146.

.. The Marthoud case (1929) (Recueil des arrets du Conseil d'Etat
(Paris, Sirey, 1929), vol. 99, p. 409).
.. Earlier decisions by Italian courts denied immunity on the
grounds that contracts of employment were private-law transactions,
while the act of dismissing or appointing a government employee or a
civil servant was invariably regarded as an exercise of sovereign
authority. See, for example, De Semenoffv. Amministrazione delle
Ferrovie dello Stato della Norvegia (1935, 1936) (footnote 48 above).
Cf. also Ferrovie Federali Svizzere v. Commune di Tronzano (1929)
(II Foro Italiano, vol. LlV (1929), p. 1146; Annual Digest ... ,
1929-1930 (London), vol. 5 (1935), p. 124), where immunity was
denied to the Swiss Federal Railways.
.. See S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (London, Stevens, 1959), pp. 239-242.
.. See Sucharitkul, "Immunities of foreign States before national
authorities", Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, 1976-1 (Leyden, Sijthoff, 1977), vol. 149, pp. 130-132.
01 See footnote 47 above.
.. See footnote 48 above.
n Rivista ... , vol. LV (1972), p. 485.
•• Ibid., p. 486.
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was not un rapporto di diritto privato. 61 In another
case, Luna v. Repubblica socialista di Romania
(1974),62 concerning an employment contract concluded
by an economic agency forming part of the Romanian
Embassy in Rome, immunity of the Socialist Republic
of Romania was upheld. The Supreme Court dismissed
Luna's claim for 7,799,212 lire as compensation for
remuneration based on the employment contract. The
court regarded such labour relations as being outside
Italian jurisdiction, qualora 10 Stato abbia agito come
soggetto di diritto internazionale, /a giurisdizione

italiana non pub sussistere, in virtu della norma consuetudinaria di diritto internazionale, generalmente
riconosciuta, sull'immunita giurisdizionale degli Stati
esteri .... 63 Looking at the objective elements, the
Court held that if rapporto d'impiego in contestazione
va senz'altro inquadrato nell'ambito dell'attivita che 10
Stato romeno (quale soggetto di diritto internazionale)
svolge in Italia per propri fini istituzionali ... 64
(d) Absence of jurisdiction

49. There appears, therefore, to be no consistent caselaw anywhere pointing to the conclusion that contracts
of employment or any aspect thereof could constitute an
exception to State immunity. On the contrary, even in
the most limited application of the principle of State
immunity, as in the case-law of Italy, immunity is
recognized and fairly consistently applied in all cases,
covering appointment, dismissal and actions for compensation or for breach of other terms of the employment or service contract. There appears to be a general
absence of jurisdiction or reluctance to exercise jurisdiction in the field of labour relations.
3.

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE

50. Further examination is warranted to see whether,
outside the case-law, there is anywhere any support for
restricting immunity in regard to employment contracts.
(a)

National legislation

5 I. In the absence of judicial decisions indicating acceptance of "contracts of employment" as an exception
to State immunity, it is only possible to conjecture that,
in the countries which have adopted national legislation
restricting immunity in this specified area of "contracts
of employment" or "labour relations", the courts will
in future have to apply their national legislation.
52. On the basis of this assumption, it is interesting to
note that section 4 of the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 19786l contains such a provision. It reads:
" Ibid., p. 485. See also, in regard to employment cases, judgment
No. 467 of 1964 concerning the United States Army-Southern European Task Force, and judgment No. 3160 of 1959 concerning a
Venezuelan naval mission (ibid.).
" See footnote 48 above.
., Rillista ... , vol. LVIII (1975), p. 599.
"Ibid.
" United Kingdom, The Public General Acts, 1978, part I. chap.
33, p. 715 (reproduced in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities ... , pp. 41 et seq.).

Exceptions from immunity
4. (I) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a
contract of employment between the State and an individual where the
contract was made in the United Kingdom or the work is to be wholly
or partly performed there.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below. this section does not apply if:
(a) at the time when the proceedings are brought the individual is a
national of the State concerned; or
(b) at the time when the contract was made the individual was
neither a national of the United Kingdom nor habitually resident there; or
(e) the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing.
(3) Where the work is for an office. agency or establishment maintained by the State in the United Kingdom for commercial purposes.
subsection (2) (a) and (b) above do not exclude the application of this
section unless the individual was. at the time when the contract was
made. habitually resident in that State.
(4) Subsection (2) (c) above does not exclude the application of this
section where the law of the United Kingdom requires the proceedings
to be brought before a court of the United Kingdom.

(5) In subsection (2) (b) above "national of the United Kingdom"
means a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. a person who is
a British subject by virtue of section 2. 13 or 16 of the British Nationality Act 1948 or by virtue of the British Nationality Act 1965. a
British protected person within the meaning of the said Act of 1948 or
a citizen of Southern Rhodesia.
(6) In this section "proceedings relating to a contract of employment" includes proceedings between the parties to such a contract in
respect of any statutory rights or duties to which they are entitled or
subject as employer or employee.

53. While this provision has no equivalent in the
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976,66 nor in Canada's State Immunity Act of 1982,67 it
appears to have been followed very closely in section 6
of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979,61 in section 6
of the State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 of Pakistan,69
and in section 5 of the South African Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981. 70 Since the practice of English
courts has, in the past, been associated with a more absolute principle of State immunity, this change of attitude, which as been followed in a number of important
Commonwealth countries applying common law, is
bound to have far-reaching influence in the development of future practice, not only in common-law
jurisdictions. The restrictive practice in this particular
area of "contracts of employment" is capable of
gathering momentum. 71
.. United States Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, chap. 97.
p. 206 (idem. pp. 55 et seq.).
" "Act to provide for State immunity in Canadian courts". which
came into force on 15 July 1982 (The Canada Gazette, Part 111
(Ottawa). vol. 6. No. 15 (22 June 1982). p. 2949, chap. 95).
.. Entitled "Act to make provision with respect to proceedings in
Singapore by or against other States. and for purposes connected
therewith". of 26 October 1979 (reproduced in United Nations.
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities .... pp. 28 et seq.).
.. The Gazette of Pakistan (Islamabad). II March 1981 (idem •
pp. 20 et seq.).
,. The Act came into force on 6 October 1981 (idem. pp. 34 et seq.).
" There is a distinct possibility that other countries. in the Caribbean and elsewhere, such as SI. Kitts and Trinidad and Tobago, will
follow this tendency.
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54. It is also to be ~~sumed that the practice of the
States which have ratIfIed the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity,72 such as Austria,73 Belgium"
and Cyprus, B like the United Kingdom, will be restrictive in this area.

,I

Article 6
States shall not claim immunity from jurisdiction either:
(0) in labour affairs or employment contracts between any State
and one or more individuals, when the work is performed in the forum
State;

(b) International conventions
(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity

55. The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity came into force in accordance with article 36,
paragraph 2, between Austria, Belgiu~ and Cy~rus ~n
II June 1976. Article 5 of the ConventIon contaInS Vlftually the same provisions as section 4 of the United
Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 intended to give effect to the Convention" and reads as follows.
Article 5
I. A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdic·
tion of a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate
to a contract of employment between the State and an individual
where the work has to be performed on the territory of the State of the
forum.
Paragraph I shall not apply where:
the individual is a national of the employing State at the time
when the proceedings are brought;
(b) at the time when the contract was entered into the individual
was neither a national of the State of the forum nor habitually resident
in that State; or
(e) the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing,
unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the forum, the courts
of that State have exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject·
matter.
2.

(0)

3. Where the work is done for an office, agency or other establish·
ment referred to in Article 7, paragaphs 2 (0) and (b) of the present ar·
ticle apply only if, at the time the contract was entered into, the in·
dividual had his habitual residence in the Contracting State which
employs him.

4.

57. Opinions of writers on the question of contracts of
employment have been very scanty. Traditionally, this
specific area has been regarded as more exclusively
within the scope of the administrative law of the
employing State and therefore more properly pertaining
to the jurisdiction of that State. 7I Commentaries by individual writers on national legislation and international
conventions have been somewhat varied. The critique
has centred upon the wording of the texts, which are unnecessarily complex and difficult of appreciation. 79 It is,
of course, the sovereign right of any State to legislate on
the subject-matter by prescribing the conditions under
which foreign States are allowed to engage in certain activities within its territory. Each State has the inherent
power, subject to treaty obligations, to exclude from its
territory foreign public agencies, including even
diplomatic representation. 10
58. It is not surprising to see a restrIctive trend
reflected in the draft articles for a convention on State
immunity proposed by the International Committee on
State Immunity and adopted by the International Law
Association at Montreal in 1982.11 This draft contains
the following provision:
Article III.

Immunity of States
56. While the fullest implications of such a provision
cannot yet be assessed, its snowballing effect is reflected
in an increasing amount of legislation in various countries, albeit not always uniform. Worthy of notice at
this juncture is the recent, Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States (1983).77
Article 6 contains the following provision restricting immunity:
" See footnote 39 above.
" See the declarations by Austria giving effect to the provisions of
the Convention, in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities .... p. 5. Austria ratified the Convention on 10 July 1974.
" Belgium ratified the Convention on 27 July 1975.
" Cyprus ratified the Convention on 10 March 1976.
" See also the almost identical formulations in the corresponding
provisions of national legislation.
" Draft approved by the Inter·American Juridical Committee, Rio
de Janeiro, on 21 January 1983 (OEA/Ser.G-CP/doc.1352183, of 30
March 1983). See also International Legal Materials (Washington,
D.c.), vol. XXII, No.2 (March 1983), p. 292 .

...

Exceptions to immunity from adjudication

A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
forum State to adjudicate in the following instances inter olio:

C.

(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

Where the foreign State enters into a contract for employment
in the forum State, or where work under such a contract is to
be performed wholly or partly in the forum State and the pro·
ceedings relate to the contract. This provision shall not apply
if:
I. At the time proceedings are brought the employee is ana·
tional of the foreign State; or

"On this question, see, for example, F. Seyersted, "Jurisdiction
over organs and officials of States, the Holy See and intergovernmen·
tal organizations", The International and Comparative Low Quar·
terly (London), vol. 14 (1965), pp. 31-82 and 493-527.
" See, for example, F. A. Mann, "The State Immunity Act 1978",
The British Year Book of International Low. 1979 (London), vol. 50,
p.54.
10 See, for example, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International
Law (3rd ed.) (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 334:
"If a State chooses. it could enact a law governing immunities of
foreign States which would enumerate those acts which would involve
acceptance of the local jurisdiction .... States would thus be given a
licence to operate within the jurisdiction with express conditions and
the basis of sovereign immunity, as explained in The Schooner 'Exchange', would be observed." See also I. Sinclair, "The law of
sovereign immunity: Recent developments", Collected Courses ... ,
1980·11 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1981),
vol. 167, pp. 214·216.
" See ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference. Montreal, 1982
(London, 1983), pp. 5·10, resolution No.6: "State Immunity".
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2. At the time the contract for employment was made the
employee was neither a national nor a permanent resident
of the forum State; or
3. The employer and employee have otherwise. agreed in
writing."

5.

AN EMERGING TREND

59. While the current practice of States is relatively
silent on contracts of employment as a possible area of
exceptions to State immunity, there appears to be an
emerging trend in favour of limitation in this darkest
area of the "grey zones". The choices available depend
on the eventual outcome of legal developments in
labour affairs and labour relations. In an endeavour to
restate the law in the process of its progressive development, utmost care should be taken to avoid interference
with the application of foreign administrative law, while
maintaining reasonable standards of labour conditions
in employment contracts within the State of the forum.
At the same time, nothing should be attempted that
would aggravate existing problems of unemployment in
a given society.
60. All things considered, an emerging trend appears
to favour the application of local labour law in regard to
recruitment of the available labour force within a country, and consequently to encourage the exercise of territorial jurisdiction at the expense of jurisdictional immunities of foreign States. It is not unnatural in such
endeavours to adopt national legislation which tends to
prescribe also the scope and limits of exercisable
jurisdiction in addition to the restriction of State immunity in this specified area. It is clear that private-law
jurisdiction has to be firmly established before the question of jurisdictional immunity arises to be resolved.
Regional conventions tend to draw also on national
jurisdiction, which should be established in a uniform
manner so as to avoid any unnecessary vacuum or
overlapping of competence.
C. Formulation of draft article 13
61. The principle to be incorporated in the draft article
should reflect the fluid state of legal developments.
Flexibility and balanced considerations should guide
any effort to formulate a draft article on "contracts of
employment". The possibility should be left open for
this exception to assert itself in State practice. On the
other hand, this should not constitute any intrusion into
the sphere of administrative law or the administrative
functions of government officials. Rather, a mild incentive could be introduced to encourage conformity with
local labour law and improve social conditions, labour
relations and the employment outlook. Two criteria are
eligible for support.. First, the nationality of the
employee could be taken into consideration as an element in favour of the application of the administrative
12 Ibid., pp. 7-8. An interesting commentary on this provision may
be found in the final report (24 June 1982) of the International Committee on State Immunity, chaired by Mr. M. Leigh; see ILA, The
ILA Montreal Draft Convention on State Immunity (London, 1983),
pp. 51-52, para. 25.

law of the employing State or, as the case may be, of the
application of the labour law of the territorial State.
The second criterion is residence in the State of the
forum, which could be qualified as regular, habitual or
permanent, not so much as the basis for jurisdiction in
private international law , but more exactly as justification for the exercise of existing territorial jurisdiction or
predilection in favour of the territorial connections, to
ensure protection of the nationals and alien residents of
the forum State.
62.

Article 13 might read as follows:

Article 13.

Contracts of employment

1. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State in
respect of proceedings relating to a "contract of
employment" of a national or resident of that other
State for work to be performed there.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the proceedings relate to failure to employ an individual or dismissal of an employee;
(b) the employee is a national of the employing State
at the time the proceedings are brought;
(c) the employee was neither a national nor a resident
of the State of the forum at the time of employment; or
(d) the employee has otherwise agreed in writing,
unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the
forum, the courts of that State have exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter.

ARTICLE 14 (Personal Injuries and damagf to property)

A. General considerations

1.

SCOPE OF "PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY" AS AN EXCEPTION TO STATE IMMUNITY

63. The purpose of draft article 14 is to examine possible limitations of State immunity in the area of "personal injuries and damage to property". This area
covers the liability of a State or one of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities to pay damages or monetary
compensation in respect of an act or omission attributable to the State, resulting in personal injury
(physical damage) to a natural person or physical
damage to property as distinct from depreciation of its
value. In common-law jurisdictions, such causes of action may be included under the heading of tortious
liability. For the purposes of jurisdictional immunity,
they may be categorized as non-commercial tort. In
civil-law and other jurisdictions, a similar heading may
be entitled civil responsibility for physical damage to
persons resulting in bodily harm, personal injuries or
death, and physical damage to tangible movable or immovable property as opposed to infringements of
property rights, or libel ?r other forms of defamation.
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64, Without further inquiry, into t,he niceties of
arious internal laws on the subject, which may cover a
:ide area of civil liability for physical damage to persons and property, one could mention, for example,
negligence or nuisance in the common-law system,
where damage is occasioned by an act or omission, or
cases of stricter liability for occupation of land and
premises, or liability for dangerous animals or for
possession and transport of dangerous substances. In
the strictest application of liability without fault, an action may lie not only for malfeasance or misfeasance or,
indeed, for non-feasance but also for failure to prevent
the occurrence of damage. The duty of care may vary in
standard and quality depending on the strictness of
liability and the degree of protection provided by the internallaw for the injured party, be it physical injury to
the person or damage to property. The damage could be
the result of a wilful act, neglect, omission or
negligence, or, indeed, it could be unintended or even
accidental. The causes of action under this heading or
possible remedies for damage grouped under "personal
injuries and damage to property" include a wide variety
of circumstances giving rise to legal relief for the injured
party, including not only the persons injured, but also,
in the event of consequent death, their heirs and dependants. As for damage to property, similar causes of action may be available to the owner, user or possessor or
the combination of such right-holders.
65. The purpose of article 14 is therefore to limit the
application of jurisdictional immunity in respect of personal injuries and damage to property caused by an act
or omission attributable to a foreign State or to one of
its organs, agencies or instrumentalities. The restriction
operates where there is State immunity, that is to say
even where the agency or instrumentality of a foreign
State has been acting in the exercise of governmental
power, so long only as the personal injury or damage to
property occurred in the territory of the State of the
forum, The extent of damage or remoteness thereof and
the types of available redress in various internal laws lie
outside the ambit of the present study.
2.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

66. The exception of "personal injuries and physical
damage to property" is not an issue, or does not arise,
where there is no question of State immunity from the
jurisdiction of the courts of another State. By the same
token, the question of State immunity should not be
raised, or indeed need not be raised, when the causes of
action are outside the jurisdiction of the courts, or when
the courts before which proceedings have been brought
have no jurisdiction, because of the subject-matter or
for territorial reasons, or are otherwise not competent
to consider and decide the case in question. It is significant to note at this juncture that, in order to avoid unnecessary inquiry into the grounds or legal bases for
jurisdiction in respect of tort or civil liability for personal injuries and damage to property, whether wilful,
malicious or merely accidental, an agreed basis or an
unchallenged or undoubted basis for jurisdiction is obViOUSly the locus delicti commissi.

39

67. Of course, under the rules of private international
law, there are possible competing criteria for the existence or foundation of jurisdiction in the circumstances under examination, such as the nationality of
the injured person, the place where the plaintiff suffered
injury as opposed to or distinct from the place where the
act or omission occurred. As regards damage to property, jurisdiction may be founded on the basis of the
physical situation (situs) of the immovable or movable
property damaged, as opposed to or distinct from the
place where the wrongful act or omission was committed or where negligence or neglect of the required duty
of care occurred. It will be seen, quite correctly and not
without well-founded reason, that national legislation
and regional conventions containing provisions on this
particular exception invariably specify the pre-existence
of legitimate jurisdiction based on the locus delicti commissi and the eventual and justifiable exercise of such
jurisdiction, even in respect of damage resulting from
activities normally categorized as acta jure imperii, and
also, in any event, from activities of a non-commercial
character, whether or not classified as acta jure gestionis. The distinction between jus imperii and jus gestionis, or the two types of activities attributable to the
State, appears to have little or no bearing in regard to
this exception, which is designed to allow normal proceedings to lie and to provide relief for the individual
who has suffered an otherwise actionable physical
damage to his own person or his deceased ancestor or to
his property. The cause of action relates to the occurrence or infliction of physical damage for which a
foreign State is answerable, although local judicial
authorities have hitherto been reluctant to exercise
jurisdiction.

3.

THE BASIS FOR THE EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION OR NON-IMMUNITY

68. It should be stated at the outset that, whatever the
legal basis for the existence or assumption of jurisdiction by the forum loci delicti commissi or the application of the lex loci delicti commissi, which may not be
challenged by other competing jurisdictions or the
choice of other applicable laws, the basis for actual exercise of jurisdiction when the act or omission complained of is attributable to a foreign State cannot be
found in customary international law. It will be seen
that the exercise of jurisdiction in proceedings involving
a foreign State as a defendant is not warranted in the
traditional practice of States. There appear, nevertheless, to be impelling reasons for an emerging trend in
the recent case-law of countries which have adopted national legislation restricting immunity in this specified
area to apply a restrictive doctrine whereby the courts
may exercise jurisdiction in cases involving personal injuries or damage to property in the territory of the State
of the forum.
69. Many theoretical justifications could be advanced
in support of the exercise of jurisdiction, or for the
absence of State immunity, in such circumstances.
Whatever the activities of a State giving rise to personal
injuries or damage to property within the territory of

r

40

Documents of the thirty-fifth session

another State, whether in connection with acta jure imperii or acta jure gestionis, the fact remains that injuries
have been inflicted upon and suffered by innocent persons, whether the act or omission was deliberate or
unintentional or, indeed, negligent or accidental. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the court of the place where
the damage has occurred is probably the best guarantee
of sound and swift justice. Adequate relief can be expected as the court is in reality a forum conveniens or,
indeed, a most practical and convenient judicial
authority with an unchallenged claim to exercise
jurisdiction and facilities to establish or disprove
evidence of liability and to assess compensation. Questions of causation or remoteness of damage as well as
the quantum of retribution of measure of damages can
best be determined by the competent forum of the place
where the damage occurred and in accordance with the
law of that place (lex locI).
70. It goes without saying that the reverse is equally
convincing. Non-exercise of jurisdiction in such a case .
may result in a vacuum. Not only will there be a shortage of a more appropriate law to be applied, but also a
more suitable court of competence will not easily be
found to try the case, which may be falling between two
stools. The absence of competent judicial authority and
lack of applicable law would leave the injured party
remediless and without adequate relief or possible
recourse, except at the mercy of the foreign State, which
might or might not feel obliged to pay compensation,
either on a voluntary basis or ex gratia. In the interests
of the rule of law and of justice, normal legal remedies
should continue to be available, regardless of the public
or private character of the defendant. This is easier said
than done, for, in actual practice, as will be seen below,
the courts have tried hard to restrict immunity in this
specific area, basing their restriction on the type of activities carried on by the State agencies or instrumentalities concerned, or the direct connection with State
activities which may be said to be genuinely acta jure
imperii as opposed to acta jure gestionis. The results
have been not altogether clear and apparently far from
certain. The practice of States remains to be closely consulted on this particular point.
71. Whatever the emerging trend in State practice, the
restrictive theories have sought to qualify or limit State
immunity on the grounds, inter alia, that the tortious
liability of a foreign State should be locally justiciable if
the damage to property, death or personal injuries have
occurred in the territory of the forum. The main purpose is the protection of the injured parties, whether
they happen to be nationals or residents of the State of
the forum, or indeed aliens or tourists temporarily in the
territory, which is nevertheless bound to afford a
reasonable measure of legal protection for the safety
and security of their persons as well as their tangible
belongings.
72. The sovereignty of the State responsible or liable
for the damage incurred by the injured individual is not
directly at stake in most cases. A State conducting ac-

tivities in the territory of another State is obliged to
respect local laws and regulations and to abide by all
ground rules. In case of infraction or violation of local
laws, with or without intent, the liability to pay compensation for damage should be accompanied by actual
payment. In particular, the primary liability of the State
in most cases of road accidents would be replaced or absorbed by insurance coverage under the existing requirements of most local traffic regulations. Payment
of compensation by an insurance company on behalf of
a foreign State is no longer regarded as an affront to
anyone, neither to the foreign State nor to the host
Government. All parties should be satisfied, especially
the aggrieved individuals who have been injured in a
motor accident.
73. The areas specified as personal injuries and
damage to property are mainly concerned with accidental death, personal injuries or damage to property such
as vehicles or fixed objects involved in a highway collision. Their scope is none the less somewhat wider,
covering also cases such as assault and battery,
malicious damage to property, arson and even murder
or political assassination. Justice should not only be
done but should also be seen to be done.
74. In an eagerness to mete out justice, care should be
taken lest a fundamental principle of international law ,
namely the principle of State immunity, be made an
object of sacrifice without sufficient cause or true
justification. While, in general, it is possible to conceive
of day-to-day activities of States which could be covered
by an insurance policy in case of fire or accident or
other natural disaster or calamity attributable to an
agency or instrumentality of a State, the possibility that
State immunity is still needed should not be precluded,
particularly in cases where the State has performed an
act exclusively in the domain of the laws of war, such
as in military operations or military exercises or
manreuvres, or indeed in operations to quell riots,
disturbances, civil war or civil strife, which are not
generally covered by peacetime insurance.
75. The sovereignty or governmental authority of a
foreign State is not being challenged when, like any
other responsible party, the State answerable for the
physical damage to persons or property is called upon to
come to the aid and assistance of the injured party. To
be humane and merciful is not inconsistent with
statehood or sovereignty. Humanity also deserves the
protection of international law. To protect the integrity
and security of the individual and his property is the
duty of every territorial State. To allow an insurance
company to settle claims against a foreign Government
is not a derogation of any sovereign right or governmental power. Social welfare requires that every person
should be safe and secure and that personal injuries be
accorded the necessary remedies. Damage to tangible
property should also be made good by the responsible
party, whoever that may be. A State is a highly respectable and very responsible party in this context. No question of sovereign equality is really involved.
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B. The practice of States

1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE PRIOR TO NATIONAL LEGISLATION

76 Before the intervention by legislatures in the 1970s
and, indeed, prior t~ the adoption .and rat.i~cation of international conventIOns on State ImmUnIties, the practice of States had been neither uniform nor consistent.
The exception of "personal injuries and damage to
property" is relatively unknown in those jurisdictions
applying a more "absolute" principle of immunity,
mainly the common-law countries, such as the United
Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and other members of the
commonwealth. The practice of socialist countries in
this area is virtually unknown. On the whole, there has
been very little evidence of State practice allowing or
disallowing State immunity in respect of proceedings for
"personal injuries and damage to property" .
77. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that in a number of
countries where judicial practice has tended to favour a
less absolute or a more restrictive principle of State immunity, attempts have been made to justify the exercise
of jurisdiction by competent courts on the grounds that
the act or omission in question relates to State acts jure
gestionis or, at any rate, not to acts jure imperii. On the
other hand, in the same "restrictive" jurisdictions, immunity has been upheld wherever the courts have found
the activities giving rise to damage to property or personal injuries to have been conducted jure imperii.
78. Thus, in a Belgian case, S.A. "Eau, gaz, electricite
et applications" v. Ojjice d'aide mutuelle (1956),13 the
Court of Appeal of Brussels upheld a plea of immunity
in proceedings arising out of a motor accident which
had occurred in March 1945 involving a British military
truck carrying troops back from leave. At the time of
the accident, the troops were engaged in belligerent
operations in Belgium. The court decided that:
As far as allied belligerents who carry out operations of war on
Belgian territory are concerned, the immunity from jurisdiction of
foreign States acting jure imperii prevents their being sued in Belgian
courts ...

79. The Court of Appeal of Schleswig in the Federal
Republic of Germany adopted this general approach
and granted jurisdictional immunity in a 1957 case involving the immunity from jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom." The plaintiff, a haulage contractor, claimed
to have suffered injury to his health when performing
his part of the contract for the recovery of certain arms
and military plans in the Soviet zone. The court found a
close link between the events giving rise to the plaintiff's
claim and the performance of sovereign functions by the
British Army.
80. In this connection, following the restrictive trend
in the practice of many States, Egyptian courts have
" Pasicrisie beige (Brussels), vol. 144 (1957), part 2, p. 88; International Law Reports, 1956 (London), vol. 23 (1960), p. 205.
.. Ibid., p. 207.
.. Immunity of United Kingdom from jurisdiction (Germany)
(1957) (International Law Reports, 1957 (London), vol. 24 (1961),
P.207).
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consistently allowed immunity from jurisdiction in
repect of acts jure imperii. There have been a number of
cases concerning acts of members of armed forces of a
foreign State in Egypt. The courts have frequently
allowed immunity in cases of tort-accident or collision
between private cars and army vehicles being driven by
officials of a foreign State in the exercise of their public
duty,l6 On the other hand, Egyptian courts have denied
immunity in respect of crimes committed by members of
foreign armed forces. when not "on duty"." Thus, in
Guebali v. Colonel Mei, I I it was held that the French
Army had no immunity from civil jurisdiction even in
matters relating to a military mission,l9
81. In a more recent decision involving a motor accident caused by negligent driving of a car owned by a
foreign Government, the Austrian Supreme Court
delivered an illuminating judgment based on interesting
analysis of the crucial acts. Thus, in Holubek
v, Government oj the United States (1961),90 it was
argued for the defendant that the carriage of mail for
and on behalf of the United States Embassy constituted
the performance of a "sovereign act" by the United
States Government. The Austrian Supreme Court, applying a distinction between acta jure imperii and acta
jure gestionis, 91 ruled that the act on which the plaintiff
.. See, for example, Dame Gali/a Bassionni Amrane v. G. S. John
Esq. (1932) (Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 62
(1935), p. 195; Annual Digest ... , 1931-1932, op. cit., case No. 90,
p. 174; Annual Digest ... , 1933-1934, op. cit., case No. 74, p. 187);
cf. the later case of Joseph Abouteboul v. Etat hellenique (1948) (The
American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 44
(1950), p. 420), where immunity appears to have been correctly
recognized with regard to acts performed by State agents not only
while on duty or on mission, but also in the exercise of a public duty.
"See, for example, Ministere public v. Constantin Tsoukharis

(1943) (Bulletin de legislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes
(Alexandria), vol. 55 (1942-1943), p. 89; Annual Digest ... , 19431945 (London), vol. 12 (1949), case No. 40, p. 150); Efstratios
Gounaris v. Ministere public (1943) (Bulletin de legislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes ... (1942-1943), p. 156; Annual Digest ... ,
1943-1945, op. cit., case No. 41, p. 152); Manuel Malero v. Ministere
public (1943) (Bulletin de legislation et de jurisprudence
egyptiennes ... (1942-1943), pp. 41 and 125; Annual Digest ... ,
1943-1945, op. cit., case No. 42, p. 154). See also Georges Triandafi/ou v. Ministere public (1942) (The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 39 (1945), p. 345).
II Dame Sofia Guebali v. Colonel Mei (1943) (Bulletin de legislation
et de jurisprudence egyptiennes ... (1942-1943), p. 120; Annual
Digest .. , , 1943-1945, op. cit., case No. 44, p. 164).
.. Cf. Henon v. Gouvernement egyptien (1947) (Bulletin de legislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes (Alexandria), vol. 59 (1946-1947),
p. 225; Annual Digest ... , 1947 (London), vol. 14 (1951), case No.
28, p. 78), where it was held that agents of a foreign Government were
immune from jurisdiction with regard to the requisition of
a villa by order of a foreign government department.
•• Juristische Blaller (Vienna), vol. 84 (1962), p. 43; International
Law Reports (London), vol. 40 (1970), p. 73; the judgment of the
Supreme Court is reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials
on Jurisdictional Immunities ... , pp. 203-207.
" The court declared:
..... an act must be deemed to be a private act where the State acts
through its agencies in the same way as a private individual can act.
An act must be deemed to be a sovereign act where the State, on the
basis of its sovereignty, performs an act of legislation or administration (makes a binding decision). Sovereign acts are those in respect
of which equality between the parties is lacking and where the place
of equality is taken by subordination of one party to the other."
(United Nations, Materials .... p. 205.)
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based his claim for damages was not the collection of
mail, but the operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant and the latter's action as a road user. The plea of
immunity was rejected. Thus, the court said,
we must always look at the act itself which is performed by State
~;gans and not at its motive or purpose. We must always investigate
the act of the State from which the claim is derived. Whether an act is
of a private or sovereign nature must always be deduced from the
nature of the legal transaction, viz. the inherent nature of the action
taken or of the legal relationship which arises."

82. Without at this stage commenting on the general
applicability of such a test or the criterion of the
"nature of the act" as the basis for a distinction to be
drawn between acts for which there is jurisdictional immunity of States and acts for which there is not, it is apparent that the complexity of the different facets of an
act, such as the operation of a motor vehicle, the collection of mail or the transport of diplomatic bags, could
be viewed differently from different angles and standpoints, with varying results and even diametrically
opposite conclusions.
2.

JUDICIAL PRACTICE FOLLOWING ADOPTION
OF RESTRICTIVE NATIONAL LEGISLATION

83. Following the adoption of national legislation on
State immunity in a number of countries in the past
decade or so, it is now to be expected that the judicial
practice in those countries will be guided by such legislation. As will be seen below (paras. 86-95), the case-law
of several jurisdictions, such as the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, Austria, Cyprus,
Pakistan, Canada, Singapore and South Africa, which
almost invariably had tended in the past to adhere to a
more absolute doctrine of State immunity, might appear, since the introduction of more restrictive legislation on immunity, to follow the restrictive trend in this
area.
84. A case directly in point which deserves mention in
this connection is the decision of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in Letelier
v. Republic oj Chile (1980).93 In September 1976,
former Chilean Ambassador and Foreign Minister
Orlando Letelier and his associate Ronni Moffitt were
killed in Washington, D.C., when the car in which they
were travelling was destroyed by an explosive device.
Two years later, their survivors and personal representatives brought a civil action against Chile, seeking compensation for tortious injuries connected with the
deaths." Plaintiffs alleged that the bomb which
" Ibid.
" United States of America, Federal Supplement, vol. 488 (1980),
p. 665. See, on this question, the interesting articles by H. D.
Collums, "The Letelier case: Foreign sovereign liability for acts
of political assassination", Virginia Journal of International Law
(Charlottesville, Va.), vol. 21 (1981), p. 251.
.. The plaintiffs set forth five causes of action: (1) conspiracy to
deprive decedents of their constitutional rights, in violation of section
1985 of title 42 of the United States Code (1976); (2) assault and battery resulting in death; (3) negligent transportation and detonation of
explosives; (4) assassination of decedents in violation of international
law; (5) assault upon Letelier, an "internationally protected person"

destroyed Letelier's car was detonated by certain individual defendants acting under the direction and with
the aid of defendants the Republic of Chile, its intelligence service, Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
(CNI), and certain individual CNI agents and officers.9l
In a preliminary opinion, the court held that it had
subject-matter jurisdiction 96 and also ruled that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act oj 1976,97 which permits a foreign State to claim immunity for certain
enumerated non-commercial torts and for acts based on
"discretionary functions", does not provide a defence
against liability where a foreign State has ordered its
agents to conduct an assassination or other acts of
political terrorism in the United States. 9I In its judgment
of 5 November 1980, the court awarded approximately
SUS 4.9 million in pecuniary damages for the survivors
and personal representatives of the victims." The decisions in this case constitute a clear precedent for the
award of pecuniary damages against a foreign State in
connection with proven acts of political violence in the
United States. Future determination of questions of
State immunity will probably be made with reference to
the terms of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as
the "sole and exclusive standards", and not on the basis
of the more customary notions of "public acts" or acts
jure imperii, such as those developed prior to 1976.
Foreign States can no longer claim immunity on the
grounds that assassinations or other acts of officially
sanctioned violence against targets in the United States
are public acts.IOO In other words, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act does not purport to give foreign States
licence or discretion to commit assassinations or other
illegal acts in the United States. 101
85. On the other hand, in other cases in which they
might have applied the exception of non-commercial
torts under section 1605, paragraph (a) (5), of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the courts have
declined to find jurisdiction. Thus jurisdiction was
found to be lacking in Yessenin- Vo/pin v. Novosti Press
Agency, Tass Agency and the Daily World (1978),102
where a libel action was brought against two Soviet
press services for defamation in connection with articles
printed abroad but circulated in the United States. The
pursuant to section 112 of title 18 of the United States Code (1976),
which proximately resulted in this death and that of Moffitt (Federal
Supplement, vol. 488, p. 666).
" For the names of the defendants, ibid., pp. 665-666. For the
criminal actions instituted at the same time: United States
v. Sepulveda (1 August 1978), United States v. Sampol (2 April 1979
and 23 March 1979), United States v. Diaz (2 April 1979), ibid.,
p. 666, footnote I.
.. In accordance with sections 1330, 1332, para. (a), 1391, para. (J),
1441, para. (d), and 1602-1611 of title 28 of the United States Code
(1976).
" Section 1605, para. (a) (5) (A) (see para. 87 below).
.. Federal Supplement, vol. 488, p. 673.
.. See Federal Supplement, vol. 502 (1981), p. 259 .
I •• Concerning other cases of political assassination and acts of international terrorism, see, for example, Time, vol. 116, No.5
(4 August 1980), p. 36; and Newsweek, 19 May 1980, p. 38.
,., See footnote 98 above.
Federal Supplement, vol. 443 (1978), p. 849.
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court found the Novosti press service to be an "agency
or instrumentality" of the Soviet State entitled to immunity. I OJ An exception to immunity was not available
because libel actions are specifically excluded from this
area of general exception. ,04 Again, in Upton et 0/.
v. Empire of Iran (1978), IDS the court declined to
assume jurisdiction because the incident concerned,
namely the collapse of the roof of a building at Tehran
airport, belonging to the Iranian State, in 1974, occurred
outside the United States. '06 In Carey v. Nationa/ Oil
Corporation (1978),'07 the court declined jurisdiction on
the grounds that the exception to immunity for tort actions does not apply to claims involving interference
with contract rights. 101 The Letelier case was therefore
the first of a kind, with a clean slate for application of
the exception of "personal injuries and damage to
property", resulting in "non-immunity" for an act of
political assassination. The far-reaching implications of
the decision in this case are still to be seen in the future
practice of United States courts. '09
3.

- Section /605.

86. Since legal developments in the case-law of States
are foreshadowed to a large extent by the adoption of
recent national legislation on State immunity recognizing the general exception of "personal injuries and
damage to property", it is necessary and desirable to
examine the pertinent provisions of these statutory enactments.
87. As has been clearly illustrated by the example of
judicial decisions in the United States of America, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976" 0 contains
an interesting and sweeping provision, which reads:
10, Ibid., p. 854 (citing section 1603, para. (b), of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act).
106 Ibid., p. 855. The court also held that the provisions of section
1605, para. (a) (2), concerning "commercial activities" as an exception to immunity, did not apply because the activities in question were
of a "public or governmental" and not a commercial nature.
10, Federal Supplement, vol. 459 (1979), p. 264.
10. The court observed that, even if there had been negligence on the
part of the defendants, it had not caused a "direct" effect in the
United States (ibid., pp. 265-266). Judgment affirmed on appeal in
1979 (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 607 (1980), p. 494).
10' Federal Supplement, vol. 453 (1978), p. 1097 .
... This case concerned an action brought by a New York corporation against the Libyan Government and the Libyan National Oil Corporation. The New York corporation sought damages for the
cancellation of supply contracts by the Libyan corporation during the
1973-1974 Arab oil embargo, involving highly visible "political" acts
by the Libyan State (ibid., pp. 1099·1\00). The judgment of the
district court was affirmed on other grounds by the Court of Appeals
of the Second Circuit in 1979 (per curiam) (Federal Reporter,
2nd Series, vol. 592 (1979), p. 673).
'0, See Collums, loc. cit. (see footnote 93 above), pp. 263·266. The
five categories of strictly political or public acts as noted in Victory
Transport Inc. v. Comisarfa General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes (1964) (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 336 (1965),
p. 354, at p. 360; International Law Reports (London), vol. 35 (1967),
p. 110) may be open to doubts.
110 See footnote 66 above.

General exceptions to the jurisdictional
immunity of a foreign State

(a) A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case:

(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, III in which
money damages are sought against a foreign State for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of
that foreign State or of any official or employee of that foreign
State-while acting within the scope of his office or employment;
except this paragraph shall not apply to:
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
(8) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights.

The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978" 2
contains a shorter and less detailed provision. Section 5
of the Act provides:
88.

Exceptions from immunity
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5.

A State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of:

(a) death or personal injury; or

(b) damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or
omission in the United Kingdom.

A closely similar if not identical provision can be
found in the more recent legislation of several commonlaw or Commonwealth countries in Asia, southern
Africa and North America, in particular in section 7 of
Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979,'IJ in section 6 of
the Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 of South
Africa" 4 and in section 6 of Canada's State Immunity
Act of 1982.'15 It is interesting to observe that the Canadian Act follows closely the wording of the United
Kingdom Act in this connection, while in regard to
"contracts of employment" it has not chosen to adopt
the United Kingdom solution. On the other hand,
Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance, 1981" 6 does not
include "death, personal injury and damage to property" as a general exception to State immunity. Since
the common-law practice, especially that of the United
Kingdom, had been considered to favour a most unqualified principle of State immunity, this relatively
sudden change of heart is causing extensive reflection in
the legislation and judicial practice of other commonlaw jurisdictions the world over.
89.

II. "(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity car·
ried on in the United States by the foreign State; or upon an act per·
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign State elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign State elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States;"
112 See footnote 65 above.
"' See footnote 68 above.
." See footnote 70 above. The expression "tangible property" is
also used.
." See footnote 67 above.
.11 See footnote 69 above.
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90. It should be further noted that national legislation
dealing with State immunity invariably touches upon
the question of scope and extent of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Thus, while the United Kingdom Act of
1978 bases jurisdiction on the locus delicti commissi, its
counterparts in other common-law jurisdictions contain
more than slight variations. Singapore's Act of 1979
and South Africa's Act of 1981 appear to follow this
principle, with reference to the place of occurrence of
the act or omission being in the territory of the State of
the forum. The Canadian Act, on the other hand, bases
jurisdiction on the place of occurrence of loss of life or
property, or damage to person and property, being in
Canada. The United States legislation, more akin to the
Canadian, seems to place greater emphasis on the occurrence of the "personal injury or death, or damage to or
loss of property" in the United States, caused by an act
or omission of a "foreign State or of any official or
employee of that foreign State while acting within the
scope of his office or employment". The United States
legislation in a way defines the attribution of liability to
the foreign State for the act or omission of its official or
employee. This general exception is, in turn, subject to
many exceptions with regard to the causes of action,
which in other jurisdictions would appear unlikely to
derive from physical damage to person or property or
the loss of life or property. The end results would appear to be broadly similar, if not the same, as it is difficult to imagine the possibility of physical injury to person or property caused by an act or omission other than
intentional, negligent or accidental. The area under consideration covers physical damage to the person which
may cause death or disability or other bodily harm, and
physical damage to tangible property or corporeal
hereditament as opposed to intangible rights, and indeed total loss or destruction of such tangible property.
By definition, this area excludes defamation-libel and
slander-but probably includes stricter liability attributable to occupiers of premises, holders of
dangerous chattels and keepers of animals, at least in
respect of physical injuries or damage to property
resulting from breach of a strict duty of care.
91. While the current practice of States which have
adopted legislation restricting immunity in this specified
area is stilI in its infancy and awaiting further
developments, it is to be assumed that other States
which have ratified an international convention containing a similar restriction will also be bound to adopt a
restrictive practice in this area. Thus Austria, Belgium
and Cyprus may be presumed to have opted for limitation of State immunity in this particular area. 1J7
(b) International conventions
(i) 1972

European Convention on State Immunity

92. The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity,1 II which came into force on 11 June 1976 in accordance with article 36, paragraph 2, between
", States having ratified the 1972 European Convention on State
Immunity (see footnotes 73 to 75 above).
III See footnote 39 above.

Austria, Belgium and Cyprus, contains the following
provision:
Article JJ
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of
a court of another Contracting State in proceedings which relate to
redress for injury to the person or damage to tangible property, if the
facts which occasioned the injury or damage occurred in the territory
of the State of the forum. and if the author of the injury or damage
was 'present in thllt territory at the time when those facts occurred.

93. This provision also serves to identify or delimit the
scope of the causes of action, which are confined to
physical damage to person or tangible property, with
the locus delicti commissi being within the territory of
the State of the forum. Territorial jurisdiction with
respect to the occurrence of the facts which occasioned
the injury or damage is reinforced by a further territorial requirement that the author of the act or omission, be it an official or employee of a foreign State to
which liability is attributable, must have been physically
present in the territory at the time those facts occurred.
This double requirement ensures the solid grounds on
which the State of the forum may found universally
recognized jurisdiction and exercise it even in proceedings involving a foreign State.
(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional

Immunity of States
94. While the fullest implications of article 11 of the
1972 European Convention have not yet been assessed
in relation to the practice of States which have ratified
and applied it, national legislation already abounds in
States sympathetic to a restrictive principle in this area.
The recent Inter-American Draft Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunity of States (1983)119 may be cited
as an example of regional efforts in pursuit of this
restrictive trend. The draft provides:
Article 6
States shall not claim immunity from jurisdiction ... :
(e) In proceedings for losses and damages or tort liabilities arising
from the activities mentioned in article 5. paragraph one;

95. The first paragraph of article 5 of the interAmerican draft convention provides: "States shall not
invoke immunity against claims relative to trade or commercial activities undertaken in the State of the forum."
This provision also bases subject-matter jurisdiction on
the place of occurrence of losses and damage being
within the forum State. It further confines grounds for
action to tort liabilities arising from trade or commercial activities undertaken by the foreign State within the
territory of the State of the forum. In some more or less
precise way, the locus delicti commissi appears to afford
an internationally accepted criterion for the assumption
of jurisdiction and a sound basis for its exercise, if ever
a general exception to State immunity is to become
universally recognized in future State practice.
'" See footnote 77 above.
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4.

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

96. While it is still too early to monitor opinions of
writers with regard to this particular area of "personal
injuries and damage to property" as an exception to
State immunity, there appears to be a growing sympathy
in the thinking of contemporary authors, who are invariably supporters of a restrictive trend. In this as well
as in other specified areas where there have been
legislative enactments and regional conventions restricting State immunity, writers can readily find justification
for such restriction. If a State so chooses, it could enact
a law governing immunities of foreign States which
would enumerate those acts requiring acceptance of the
local jurisdiction. 12O There appears to be danger that
legal developments may not follow the same or a similar
pattern if States are encouraged to adopt their own national legislation without regard for evolving international standards. Even regional conventions applicable
exclusively among the contracting States could generate
restrictive principles for third States, once participating
countries proceed to implement their regional treaty
obligations by enacting national legislation which would
in any event be applicable to foreign States alike in
regard to the exercise of territorial jurisdiction or
subject-matter jurisdiction, closely linked to the territory of the forum State or with substantial contacts
with the territorial State.
97. This restrictive trend finds unmistaken expression
in the draft articles for a convention on State immunity
prepared at the 1982 conference of the International
Law Association,121 which groups international lawyers
from all walks of life and from the various legal systems
the world over. It is the collective support for a restrictive trend in this particular area that deserves mindful
attention. Thus the draft provides:

Article /11.

Exceptions to immunity from adjudication

A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
forum State to adjudicate in the following instances inter alia:
F.

Where the cause of action relates to:
I. Death or personal injury; or
2. Damage to or loss of property.
Subsections I and 2 shall not apply unless the act or omission
which caused the death, injury or damage occurred wholly or
partly in the forum State.

98. Subject-matter jurisdiction is therefore unmistakably tied to the locus delicti commissi. This provision is not necessarily intended to regulate questions of
conflict of laws or of jurisdictions in private international law, but rather to suggest a sound foundation in
public 'internationallaw and an acceptable international
standard for the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by the
12. See, for example, the authors cited above: Mann (footnote 79),
Brownlie (footnote 80) and Sinclair (ibid.).
'" See footnote 81 above.

State of the forum in proceedings against foreign States
in this specified area.

s.

AN EMERGING TREND

99. In the light of the growing opinion of writers and
the increasing practice of States favouring the exercise
of jurisdiction, where there is sound ~ubject-matter
jurisdiction, in proceedings against foreign States for
personal "injuries and damage to property, an emerging
trend is becoming more readily discernible in favour
of relief being granted to individuals for the personal
injury suffered or for the loss of or damage to their
property. The problem confronting the international
community is not so much whether or not to limit or
restrict the application of State immunity, but rather
how to allow the exercise of territorial jurisdiction in a
generally accepted area. The emerging trend could lead
to confusion and disorder if the international community fails to intervene at this stage by giving whatever
advice and guidance may be needed to harmonize and
reorient the emerging trend towards to healthier direction and achieve more salutary results for all concerned,
the foreign sovereign States as well as the aggrieved individuals.

C. Formulation of draft article 14
100. In an endeavour to formulate a draft article containing this general exception, adequate expression
should be given to the emerging trend in international
legal opinion reflecting the mounting practice of
States-judicial and legislative as well as governmental.
Some basic elements appear to require precise specification. The area under review unequivocally covers "personal injury", including loss of life or physical injury to
the person, as well as "damage to property", including
loss or total destruction of tangible property. It is clear
from the type of physical damage inflicted upon the person or property that the causes of action could arise
from any activities undertaken by a foreign State or one
of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities within the
State of the forum. It is equally clear that the infliction
of personal injury or physical damage to property could
be intentional or accidental or the result of negligent or
reckless conduct, for which the foreign State is liable,
either in tort as is commonly understood in commonlaw jurisdictions, such as for assault, battery, negligence
or a traffic accident, or in any other type of civil action
for personal injury or damage to property. Damage to
reputation or defamation is not personal injury in the
physical sense, nor can interference with contract rights
or any rights, including economic or social rights, be
viewed as damage to tangible property. Of course, the
territorial connection should also be expressly mentioned so as not to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction
or otherwise un-overreachable subject-matter jurisdiction on the State of the forum simply to provide a
remedy for redressing personal injury or damage to property where none would in any event exist within the
forum State.
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101. Article 14 might read as follows:

Article U.

Personal injuries and damage to property

Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from
the Jurisdiction of the courts of another State in respect
of proceedings relating to injury to the person or death
or damage to or loss of tangible property. if the act or
omission which caused the injury or damage in the State
of tbe forum occurred in that territory. and tbe autbor
of tbe injury or damage was present tberein at tbe time
of its occurrence.

ARTICLE IS

(Ownership. possession and use of property)

A. General considerations
1.

SCOPE OF "OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION AND USE OF PROp·
ERTY" AS AN EXCEPTION TO STATE IMMUNITY

102, As has been seen in connection with part II,
"General principles", under article 7, paragraph 3,
"a proceeding before a court of a State shall be considered to have been instituted against another State
... when the proceeding is designed to deprive that
other State of its property or of the use of property in its
possession or control" .122 State immunity could thus be
invoked even though the proceeding is not brought
directly against a foreign State but is merely aimed
at depriving that State of its property or of the use of
property in its possession or controL Without, at this
stage, touching on the question of State immunity in
respect of attachment and execution of its property, it
will suffice to recall that a State is immune when a proceedipg affects its ownership of property, or when the
use of property in its possession or control is thereby affected.
103. Jurisdictional immunity of a State in respect of
its ownership or use of property in its possession or control is recognized as a general principle. It is the purpose
of the present draft article to define and delineate the
scope of its application. Admittedly, as a general rule, a
proceeding seeking to deprive a foreign State of its
property or the use of property in its possession or control will be disallowed on application of the principle of
State immunity. There are, however, various categories
of circumstances or cases in which a proceeding will be
permitted even though it may involve ownership of
property contested by a foreign State or the use of property in the possession or control of that State.

104. In the first place, a proceeding may be brought
which relates to the property of a foreign State or to the
use of property in its possession or control situated in
the territory of the State of the forum if it does not seek
to deprive the foreign State of its ownership of that
property or of its use but merely, for instance, to have
the transfer of title deeds properly registered or to estab• 12

See footnote 12 above.

lish the existence or compel registration of easements or
mortgage or other charges connected with the property.
105. In order to invoke State immunity in a proceeding relating to ownership of its property or the use
of property in its possession or control, the State may
have to assert its claim of interest, which could cover
either ownership of the right to use the property, or its
actual possession or effective control. Mere assertion
will nowadays not suffice to establish jurisdictional immunity in such a case, unless ownership by the State or
its right to use is admitted by the parties to the litigation,
or unless the State can provide prima facie evidence of
title or proof of its claims of interest. Unless and until
such claims of interest are established, the court may exercise jurisdiction; but once ownership by the State is
established or its right to use the property is proven,
then the general principle of State immunity comes into
play and the proceeding may only be resumed if it still
falls within one of the exceptions in part III. With
regard to property, there is a clear exception to be embodied in draft article 15. The scope and application of
this important, time-honoured exception will become
more apparent upon closer study and analysis of certain
essential questions.

2.

PREDOMINANT AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF
THE SITUS A DECISIVE FACTOR

106. An important aspect of the principle par in parem
imperium non habet is reflected in the proposition that
an extraterritorial authority cannot be vested with the
power to exercise imperium within the territorium of
another sovereign State, unless of course the territorial
sovereign expressly consents to such exercise, which will
have to be very limited in time as well as in scope. An
unlimited concession of the exercise of extraterritorial
sovereign authority would have a destructive effect
upon the very existence of territorial sovereignty. The
generally recognized sovereign authority over persons
and things situated or present within the territory of a
State must therefore be vested in the territorial State
itself. Thus the authority of the territorial State to administer or to legislate or decide disputes relating to persons or property within the confines of its territory can
be challenged by no other State. No one may contest the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction over persons and
property within the recognized framework and consistently with other principles of international law, such as
the treatment of aliens, the principle of non-discrimination or human rights.
107. As far as property is concerned, especially immovable property, the State of the situs exercises
supreme authority as part and parcel of its sovereignty.
Indeed, the concept of ownership and other proprietary
rights or interests can only exist within the framework
of the legal system of the situs, and such a concept is
bound to be inherently absorbed within the notion of
territorial sovereignty of the State of the situs itself.
This appears to constitute a sound proposition of international law, as the inductive approach adopted in the
present study will later reveal (paras. 116-137 below) .

--
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08 While a State may conceivably exercise its
I v~reign authority over its nationals and its officials,
SO encies or instrumentalities in the conduct of their ac~~ities abroad or in the territory of another State, such
dontrol or authority based on the national character or
erso nal nature is eminently absent in so far as property
~ituated outside its territorial boundary is concerned,
especially if the property in question, whether movable
or immovable, is situated within the territory of another
State. A State has the authority to require its nationals
to pay taxes or to perform traditional national services,
but it cannot hope to extend similar authority, whether
legislative, administrative or even judicial, over property situated outside its territorial authority; much less if
the property is situated in the territory of another
sovereign authority; far less also if it is an immovable
property, subject to the lex situs and the territorial
sovereignty of the local sovereign authority. The
predominant authority of the State of the situs is a
decisive factor in determining the question of available
jurisdiction.

3.

PRIORITY OF THE LEX SITUS A DETERMINATIVE ELEMENT

109. If the authority of the State of the situs should
prevail in any event or in most cases where there appears
to be overlapping or concurrence, if not conflict, of
jurisdictions, there seems to be an added reason for the
predominance or primacy of the territorial authority.
The applicable law is unmistakably the lex situs as no
other law can be more proper than the law of the place
where the property itself is situated. A fortiori the
regime or legal relationship with regard to land or immovable property, with its peculiar history, niceties and
complexities, has developed in response to the needs of
the territorial society, its traditions, usages and
customs. Every system of land law or law concerning
immovable property is unique in itself. Its exclusive applicability cannot be disputed, since ownership and
other proprietary rights or interests in property do not
and cannot exist except within the framework and purview of the lex situs. The supremacy of the lex situs and
its sole authority in regard to property have rendered the
assumption and exercise of territorial jurisdiction by the
forum rei sitae all the more inevitable; in the absence of
any alternative or competitive system of law, neither the
lex patriae nor the lex fori of an extraterritorial authority could qualify to replace or supplant either the
jurisdiction of the forum rei sitae or the exclusive applicability of the lex situs.
110. Faced with the decisive priority of the territorial
jurisdiction and the exclusive application of its internal
law governing legal relations with regard to property,
especially immovable and to a large extent also movable
property, a kind of exception has long been recognized
and admitted in the practice of States. A State is not immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
State in respect of proceedings relating to a series of
classes or categories of cases involving the application
of the internal law of the State of the situs. In any event,
the forum rei sitae is a most convenient court competent
to apply the internal law of the State of the situs. The
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rights and interests of the foreign State or the extraterritorial State with regard to property situated within the
territory of the State of the situs can only be recognized
under the internal law of the territorial State. When it
comes to the authority of the internal law and a foreign
State may derive rights and interests only by virtue of
the application of the internal law of the situs and with
the aid and assistance of the judicial authority of the
situs, then the only sensible solution is to recognize the
determinative authotity or the deciding power of the territorial State. The extraterritorial State may be said to
have waived immunity or to have itself invoked the
jurisdiction of the territorial State when questions of
property rights within the State of the situs have to be
determined by the judicial authority or the local
sovereign and with its internal law, the lex situs, being
the only applicable law.
111. An alternative solution or sheer insistence on the
principle of State immunity would only lead to chaos
and absurdity. There would be a legal vacuum, as the
rights and interests of the extraterritorial authority itself
would be without legal foundation, failing its own
recognition of and respect for the internal law of the territorial State. In fact, this is an accurate and orderly application of the maxim par in parem jurisdictionem non
habet. It is the extraterritorial State that has no authority to introduce a new legal system within the territorial
framework of another sovereign State. It follows that
the only internal law that prevails in the circumstances is
that of the State of the situs. If need be, such an exceptional situation could be viewed from the standpoint of
the outside State or extraterritorial authority as an exception to its otherwise available jurisdictional immunity.
4.

POSSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
BY A FOREIGN STATE UNDER THE INTERNAL LAW OF THE
STATE OF THE SITUS

112. If a State acquires property in the form of ownership or other proprietary rights and the property,
whether immovable or movable, is situated in the territory of another State, the acquisition of such property
is made possible only by virtue of the application of the
internal law or private law of the State of the situs. The
outside State or extraterritorial State as an outsider
must, from the start, fully recognize and respect the
local or territorial internal law which unquestionably
governs the legal relationship between the foreign State
and the property so acquired. To disobey the rules of
the internal law of the situs is to forfeit, abandon or
relinquish legal rights to property under the prevailing
system. This is particularly true of immovable property
which cannot change its location, while movable property could be transported out of the territory of its
former situs and be subjected to a different system of internal law. Whatever the case, internal law of the situs
governs the questions of acquisition and loss of property, including title and other proprietary rights.
113. Under the internal law of the situs, there may be
several methods of acquiring property, such as by sale
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or purchase, by usucapio longi temporis Or prescription,
by testate or intestate succession, or by devolution or
transfer as bona vacantia. Thus it is pre-eminently by
virtue of the internal law of the situs that questions of
title, ownership and other proprietary rights are to be
determined.

ity, it is this one. For reasons that are apparent from the
general considerations above, State practice seems to
bear out the absence of immunity for proceedings involving determination of ownership of property and its
acquisition or title under the internal law of the State of
the situs by the territorial court.

114. It is also the judicial authority of the situs that
appears to be omnicompetent to apply the lex situs, and
it is by the grace and authority of the forum rei sitae that
questions or disputes relating to titles, ownership or acquisition of property are adjudicated. In proceedings
concerning the ascertainment of ownership or other
rights to property, such as trust funds, real estate or
bank accounts, parties interested in the determination
of their rights or their portio legitima do come to court
of their own free will. There is no element of compulsion or, to use an old English term, "no impleading of a
foreign sovereign against his will". If the foreign State
intervenes or interpleads, it does so on a voluntary
basis, for such proceedings are often not against any
party, but merely to determine the nature and extent of
the legal interests of all the parties concerned. If the
foreign State chooses to seek the judicial determination
of its rights and titles under the internal law of the situs,
it is free to do so or to be represented before the court of
competence. If, however, the foreign State does not feel
so inclined or obliged, it may decline at the risk of
forfeiting its rightful title or property.

117. A decision by the District Court of Tokyo in Limbin Hteik Tin Lat v. Union of Burma (1954)124 is a case
dir~tly in point. The proceedings related to a dispute as
to title to a piece of land in Tokyo. The court ruled that
Japan had jurisdiction and that the court had competence over the proceedings, in which the respondent
was a foreign State. The court declared:

115. With regard to movable property, there may be
different types of property that can enter and leave the
territory of another State. It is no longer enough that
the foreign State merely asserts °its title; it may be required to give evidence to prove title or to establish its
ownership or possession or the right to use. This is all
the more significant if the property in question is a
seagoing vessel, an aircraft, a hovercraft or a spaceship,
or indeed a communications satellite or a space laboratory. While there are special regimes of public international law regulating many of the questions involved,
such as the responsibility of the launching State for
damage caused and the obligation to return the space
object,123 the more mundane and fundamental questions of title, rights and interests in property under the
internal law remain to be adjudged, in each instance, by
the court of recognized competence which, in most
cases, even for movable property, still happens to be the
forum rei sitae, namely the court of the State in whose
territory the property is situated or to be found at the
time of the proceedings.
0

B. The practice of States
1.

JUDICIAL PRACTICE

116. The judicial practice of States in this area of
"ownership, possession and use of property" as an exception to State immunity is not unknown. If there is an
area which is less grey as an exception to State immun'" See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 961, p. 187).

A State is not subject to the exercise of power by another State, and
therefore is not subject to the jurisdiction of another State in the matter of civil proceedings. This is to be admitted as a principle of internationallaw recognized in general. ... However ... in an action concern. ing immovables, it is widely admitted that jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the State of the situs, and consequently it must be said that
a foreign State may be subject to the jurisdiction of another State.'"

118. The case-law of the United Kingdom has been accurately summarized by Lord Denning, Master of the
Rolls, in Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture,
Directorate of Agricultural Supplies (1975),126 in his
judgment confirming a restrictive view he had earlier
proposed in Rahimtoola v. Ni1.am of Hyderabad
(1957).125 Accepting the general principle that "except
by consent, the courts of this country will not issue their
process so as to entertain a claim against a foreign
sovereign for debt or damages", Lord Denning then
outlined four existing exceptions in English case-law:
First, (there isl no immunity in respect of land situate in
England ... .
Second ... in respect of trust funds here or money lodged for the
payment of creditors ....
Third ... in respect of debts incurred here for services rendered to ...
property here ....
Fourth, (when) a foreign sovereign ... enters into a commercial
transaction with a trader here and a dispute ari~es which is properly
within the territorial jurisdiction of (English) courts. '"

119. Lord Denning's dicta and observations have been
found to have compelling reasons even outside the
". International Law Reports (London), vol. 32 (1966), p. 124; text
reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities ... , pp. 339-340.
'" The court added:
..... an immovable is an object par excellence of territorial
sovereignty of the State of its situs and this fact has been regarded
as worthy of respect as a matter of international comity; hence it
has come to be recognized for a long time that an action directly
concerning immovables comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the State of the situs. It has to be admitted, therefore, that ... this
principle has been recognized as applicable in actions in which a
foreign State is a party, as well as where a private person is a
party. "
... The All England Law Reports, 1975, vol. 3, p. 961.
'" United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House of Lords, 1958,
p.379.
m Loc. cit. (footnote 126 above), pp. 965-966. See also the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ontario in Harold W. M. Smith
v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission (1976) (International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XV, No.2 (1976),
p. 319).
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vnited Kingdom. 129 With regard to the exception of
trading or comme~cial activities considered earlier, the
position was reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the
"ICongreso del Partido "case (1981).130 The first three
exceptions fall within the specified area of the present
draft article, viz. immovable and movable property, including trust funds.
120. The doctrine of "trust" as conceived by the
Chancery and other courts of equitable jurisdiction has
long been recognized in English practice as an exception
to immunity. Actions may proceed in spite of the fact
that a foreign Government may have an interest in the
trust fund. In Duke oj Brunswick v. King oj Hanover
(1844),131 Lord Langdale, Master of the Rolls, considered it possible to make a foreign sovereign a party to
administration proceedings, since doing so did not
"compel" him to take part in them, it merely gave him
"an opportunity to come in to ... establish his interest" .
Similarly it was said by Justice Maugham in the Russian
Bank jor Foreign Trade case (1933)132 that the fact that
the proceedings related to funds in which the Soviet
Government had an interest could not prevent the
Chancery Division from performing its duty.
121. This notion of trust has also provided the
Chancery courts with a new basis for exercising jurisdiction in actions against third parties in respect of Stateowned property in their hands, whenever it is possible to
regard the property as trust funds in the custody of the
trustees. This was actually decided by Lord Hatherley in
Lariviere v. Morgan (1872),133 concerning the supply of
cartridges to the French Government during the FrancoPrussian war. Morgan opened a bank account in
England on behalf of the French Government for settlement of the latter's contractual obligations. The Court
of Appeal denied immunity, treating the bank account
as trust property and the action as one against Morgan,
not as a foreign State agent, but as a trustee. The House
of Lords appears to have approved of this doctrine of
trust. I H The same principle has been applied in subsequent cases. III
J2t See, for example, Justice Owen in the Court of Appeal of
Quebec in Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (1969)
(Canada, The Dominion Law Reports, Third Series (Toronto), vo\. 5
(1969), p. 128).
'" See footnote 30 above.
'" House of Lords Cases (London), vo\. II (1848-1850) (1851), p. 1;
see also Lord Radcliffe in the "gold bars" case, United States of
America and Republic of France v. Dollfus Mieg et Cie S.A. and Bank
of England (1952) (The All England Law Reports, 1952, vo\. 1,
p. 572, at p. 589).
'" United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Chancery Division, 1933,
p. 745. The court assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the Soviet
Government might possibly intervene to establish a claim to some part
of the assets.
II. United. Kingdom, The Law Reports, Chancery Appeal Cases,
vo\. VII (1872), p. 550.
," Morgan v. Lariviere (1875) (The Law Reports, English and Irish
Appeal Cases, vo\. VII (1875), p. 423).
II. See, for example, Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Limited
(1937) (The Law Reports, Chancery Division, 1938, p. 545), on appeal
(1938) (ibid., p. 839); Nizam of Hyderabad and another v. Jung and
others (1956) (The All England Law Reports, 1957, vol. 1, p. 257);
and Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad (1957) (/oc. cit. (footnote
127 above), pp. 392-398 (Viscount Simonds».

122.

Reference to English case-law recognizing the ex-

~ept.ion under consideration is not without significance

View of the traditional association of English judicial
practice with an almost unqualified principle of
sovereign immunity. It is not surprising that a similar
exception is recognized in other case-laws, such as in
Italy, where the jurisprudence distinguishes between the
State as potere politico and as persona civile. Thus, as
early as 1882, the dual personality of the State was
recognized in Morellet v. Governo Danese, 136 where the
Court of Cassation of Turin distinguished between the
State as a political entity and as a corpo morale and
observed that, in the latter capacity, the State must "acquire and own property, it must contract, it must sue
and be sued, and in a word, it must exercise civil rights
in like manner as any other juristic person or private individual (un altro corpo morale 0 privato individuo
qualunque)" .1l1

10

123. The case-law of the States applying a restrictive
principle of State immunity invariably allows actions to
proceed which may involve titles or interests of a foreign
Government or transactions concerning immovable
property situated in the territory of the State of the
forum. III

2.

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE

124. Judicial practice in this particular area appears to
be more settled and consistent in support of an
established exception to State immunity, although there
is no prototype judicial decision on every point at issue
in every existing case-law. It would be neither desirable
nor practical to expect that every judicial system must
have litigation on any given point. The practice of States
in this connection amply supplements judicial practice
in a number of ways, notably by way of replies to the
Secretariat's questionnaire and by adoption of specific
national legislation on the precise point under consideration.
(a) Views oj Governments

125. In the replies to the questionnaire, 139 it is possible
to gather interesting evidence of governmental opinion
II. Loc. cit. (footnote 33 above), pp. 130-13\.
'" Idem; cited in Harvard Law School, Research in International
Law, part III, "Competence of Courts in regard to Foreign States"
(Cambridge, Mass., 1932), published as Supplement to The American
Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 26 (1932),
pp. 481-482.
"' See, for example, S.E. Echref Badnjevic es qualite de Ministre de
Yougoslavie en Egyptev. W. R. Fanner (1947) (Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vols. 73-76 (1946-1949), p. 113), where the
Mixed Court of Cairo denied immunity for the purchase of an immovable property by a foreign legation to be used as a hOtel
diplomatique. Cf. the Republic of Latvia case (l95S) (International
Law Reports, 1955 (London), vol. 22 (1958), p. 230), where the Court
of Appeal of West Berlin confirmed the decision of the Restitution
Chamber (1953) on the grounds that "that principle does not apply if
the foreign State enters into property relations with other States or
their citizens, and acts not as the holder of sovereign powers but exclusively as the holder of private rights and liabilities in the field of
private law, being active in the field of civil-law and especially
commercial-law transactions."
'" See footnote 29 above.
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and practice in support of the exception under review.
Thus, in Hungary, a socialist country, State immunity is
regulated by item (a) of section S6 of Law Decree
No. 13 of 1979, under which a foreign State is exempt
from the jurisdiction of a court or other public author·
ity of the Hungarian State.·· o The landed property of a
foreign State in Hungary, however, belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of a Hungarian court of law or other
public authority.···
126. Madagascar adopted the same restrictive view.
Under article 29 of Ordinance No. 62-041 of
19 September 1962:
"Property is governed by the law of the place where it is situated.
"In particular, immovable property situated in Madagascar, even
when foreign-owned, is governed by Malagasy law."
Under this provision, if movable or immovable property is situated
'in Madagascar, the foreign State's title to that property or other property rights are governed by Malagasy law.
As to testate succession:
If the property is immovable, it is governed by the law applicable
where it is situated;
If the property is movable, it is governed by the law applicable
where the deceased was domiciled (art. 31 of Ordinance No. 62-041 of
19 September 1962).'42

127. Similar views were expressed by other Governments in their replies to the questionnaire, including
Togo, Portugal and Trinidad and Tobago. Thus, in the
view of Togo:
If a foreign State owns or succeeds to an immovable or movable
property situated in Togo, that State is subject to the regime of proof
established by Togolese law for determining title to property.
However, if the immovable or movable property is for diplomatic or
similar uses, it enjoys extraterritoriality and immunity from
distraint. ,.,

(b) Nationa//egis/ation

130. An increasing amount of national legislation has
been adopted in the past 10 years or so, recognizing or
confirming the existence of an exception in regard to
property situated in the State of the forum. These provisions are far from identical and do not always deal with
the same subject·matter.
131. Thus, in the· United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, •• , there are two unrelated provisions concerning property:
Section 1605.

(a) A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States ... in any case:

(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for
such property is present in the United States in connection with
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign State; or that property or any property exchanged for
such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign State and that agency or instrumentality is
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the
United States are in issue;

132. The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 U7
contains a provision analogous to that cited above, but
which is more detailed. Section 6 of the Act reads:
Exceptions from immunity
6.

128. Giving a list of exceptions to State immunity, the
Portuguese reply contained the following:
Relying on what might be described as a universally accepted doctrine, the Portuguese courts agree that such immunity ceases only if:
The proceedings relate to immovable property;
There is an express or tacit waiver of immunity;
The forum hereditatis exception is allowed. ,..

General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity
of a foreign State

(I) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to:

(a) any interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, im-

movable property in the United Kingdom; or
(b) any obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its
possession or use of, any such property.
(2) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to any
interest of the State in movable or immovable property, being an interest arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia.

129. The views expressed by Trinidad and Tobago are
equally revealing:

(3) The fact that a State has or claims an interest in any property
shall not preclude any court from exercising in respect of it any
jurisdiction relating to the estates of deceased persons or persons of
unsound mind or to insolvency, the winding up of companies or the
administration of trusts.

The exceptions or limitations provided by the common law of
Trinidad and Tobago and those recognized by governmental practice
in Trinidad and Tobago with respect to jurisdictional immunities of
foreign States and their property relate to:
(i) Actions relating to land within the jurisdiction (e.g. actions to
recover rent from mortgage interest);
(ii) Actions by a local beneficiary relating to a trust fund within the
jurisdiction. '"

(4) A court may entertain proceedings against a person other than a
State notwithstanding that the proceedings relate to property:
(a) which is in the possession or control of a State; or
(b) in which a State claims an interest,
if the State would not have been immune had the proceedings been
brought against it or, in a case within paragraph (b) above, if the claim
is neither admitted nor supported by prima facie evidence.

,•• Text reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities ... , p. 17.
,., See the reply of Hungary to question I, ibid., p. S7S.
'42 Reply of Madagascar to question 14, ibid., p. S83.
,., Reply of Togo to question 14, ibid., p. 609.
,•• Reply of Portugal to question 3, ibid., p. S92.
... Reply of Trinidad and Tobago to question 11, ibid., p. 612.

133. It should be further noted that a corresponding
provision is also included in section 8 of Singapore's
State Immunity Act, 1979, ••• in section 7 of Pakistan's
'" See
.., See
'" See
section 6

footnote 66 above.
footnote 6S above.
footnote 68 above. Section 8 is a verbatim reproduction of
of the United Kingdom model.
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State Immunity Ordinance, 1981,149 in section 7 of the
Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 of South Africa, 150
and in section 8 of Canada's State Immunity Act
of 1982},1
(c) International conventions
(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity

134. The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 152 contains two relevant provisions:
Article 9
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of
a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to:
(a) its rights or interests in, or its use or possession of, immovable
property; or
(b) its obligations arising out of its rights or interests in, or use or
possession of, immovable property

Article 6
States shal1 not claim immunity from jurisdiction ... :
(b) In proceedi~gs for the distribution of assets, be they of a civil,
trade or commercial nature;
(c) In actions involving real property located in the State of the
forum with the exceptions contained in international treaties or in
diplomatic or consular practices;

137. Paragraph (c) also bases the assumption of
jurisdiction on the location or geographical situation of
the immovable property, subject to the limitations contained in bilateral or multilateral agreements, or in
diplomatic or consular practice. It does not include
movable property. Paragraph (b) deals with another
type of proceedings, namely distribution of assets of a
civil, trade or commercial nature.

3.

and the property is situated in the territory of the State of the forum.

Article 10
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of
a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a right
in movable or immovable property arising by way of succession, gift
or bona vacantia.

135. Article 9 provides for non-immunity in proceedings concerning the rights and obligations of a State
in, or in connection with, immovable property situated
in the territory of the forum State. "Possession" is not
always regarded as a right in the sense attributed to that
term in certain legal systems. The expressions "right",
"use" and "possession" should be interpreted broadly.
This article covers proceedings concerning the rights of
a foreign State in immovable property in the forum
State, including mortgages, nuisance, trespass or other
unauthorized use, lease or tenancy agreements, possession or eviction, rents or payments for use of the
property and liabilities of the occupier of immovable
property. Article 10 provides for non-immunity in
proceedings relating to a right arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia, which in some legal systems
is considered as a right of succession, and in others as a
right of forfeiture of goods without ownership.
(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunity of States
136. The recent Inter-American Draft Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunity of States (1983)153 contains a
brief provision on this exception:

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

138. In this particular field of proceedings relating to
rights to property, especially immovable property,
situated in the State of the forum, opinions of writers
are practically uniform in favour of the assumption and
exercise of jurisdiction by the competent judicial
authority of the forum State. This relatively clear trend
of legal opinions has reflected the less controversial
practice of States in upholding jurisdiction and rejection
of immunity in the interest of administration of justice.
The opinions of lawyers may be gathered from international meetings such as that of the Institute of International Law in 1952,154 and more recently that of the
International Law Association in 1982.
139. The draft articles for a convention on State immunity adopted by the International Law Association
in 1982 155 contain the following provision:
Article /11.

Exceptions to immunity from adjudication

A foreign State shal1 not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
forum State to adjudicate in the fol1owing instances inter alia:
D.

Where the cause of action relates to:
1. The foreign State's rights or interests in, or its possession or
use of, immovable property in the forum State; or
2. Obligations of the foreign State arising out of its rights or
interests in, or its possession or use of, immovable property
in the forum State; or
3. Rights or interests of the foreign State in movable or immovable property in the forum State arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia.

4.
'" See footnote 69 above. Section 7 of the Pakistan Ordinance is
entitled "Ownership, possession and use of property".
IS. See footnote 70 above. Subsection (2) of section 7 exempts from
the jurisdiction of South African courts proceedings relating to a
foreign State's title to, or its use or possession of, property used for a
diplomatic mission or a consular post.
." See footnote 67 above. Section 8 is confined to proceedings
relating to a State's interest in property arising by way of succession,
gift or bona vacantia.
'"~ See footnote 39 above .
•" See footnote 77 above.
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AN ESTABLISHED EXCEPTION

140. In a far less controversial area such as that of
"ownership, possession and use of property" by States,
IS' See, for example, the views expressed by members of the Institute on the report and final draft resolutions presented by
E. Lemonon on "L'immunite de jurisdiction et d'exetution forcee des
Etats etrangers" (Annuaire de I'/nstilul de droit international, 19$2
(Basel), vol. 44, part I, pp. Set seq.). See also P. Jessup, rapporteur
for the Harvard Law School draft on "Competence of Courts in
regard to Foreign States", op. cit. (footnote 137 above).
"' See footnote 81 above.
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currently under examination, it is possible to conclude,
after having analysed the judicial, governmental and
legislative practice of States, that there is an established
general exception to State immunity. International legal
opinion lends credence to such a proposition. The
problem is not to overcome a political or psychological
barrier, but rather to define, delimit and possibly demarcate the scope of the application of this general
exception and its ramifications. Further analysis may be
needed in an endeavour to formulate an appropriate
provision for this draft article.
C. Formulation of draft article 15
141. The contents of this draft article should cover immovable as well as movable property of a State or in
which a State has or claims an interest. It should also
cover the use of property in the possession or control of
a foreign State. Proceedings may relate to rights as well
as obligations of the foreign State in regard to property
situated in the State of the forum. They may also relate
to rights and interests of a foreign State arising within
the State of the forum by way of succession, gift or
bona vacantia. The provision should also deal with the
possibility of a foreign State asserting ownership or any
other claims of interest in a property in issue 156 and with
the borderline between the various cases in which the
court rejects or recognizes such claims of interest, and in
which it could thereby deny or uphold immunity and
decline to exercise further jurisdiction after having ex". See, for example, the "gold bars" case (1952) (see footnote 131
above); Hong Kong Aircraft: Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air
Transport Corp. (1953) (United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House
of Lords, 1953, p. 70), cf. the judgment in first instance by Sir Leslie
Gibson (1950) (International Law Reports, 1950 (London). vol. 17
(1956), p. 173. case No. 45); and Juan Ysmael & Co. v. Government
of the Republic of Indonesia (1954) (The Law Reports, House of
Lords, 1955. p. 72).

amined or established prima facie evidence of title or
proof of posse.ssion or effective control of property in
issue or the use of which is in dispute. There are also
reasons for excluding from this exception the special
status of diplomatic and consular premises.
142.

Article IS might read as follows:

Article 15. Ownership, possession
. and use 0/ property
1. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State in
respect of proceedings relating to:
(a) any right or interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, or any obligation of the State arising out
of its interest in, or its possession or use of, any immovable property situated in the State of the forum; or
(b) any right or interest of the State in any immovable or movable property in the State of the forum,
arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia; or
(c) the distribution of assets in connection with the
estates of deceased persons or persons of unsound mind
or insolvency, the winding up of companies or the administration of trusts, in which a State has or claims a
right or interest in any property; or
(d) any property in the possession or control of a
State or in which a State claims a right or interest, if the
claim is neither admitted nor supported by prima facie
evidence, and the proceedings have been brought
against a person other than a State, if the State itself
would not have been immune had the proceedings been
brought against it.
1. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the immunities of States in respect of their property from attachment and execution, or the inviolability of premises
of diplomatic or special missions or consular premises.

